190 The Nature of Political Theory
also draws a similar distinction between the communitarian (more neo-Athenian)
republicanism of Michael Sandel and the neo-Roman variant of Pettit and Skinner
(Barber 1984; Pettit 1997: 239; Brugger 1999: 13–14; Maynor 2003: 31).^14
Although the Barber and Pettit contrast does not quite work, nonetheless the
above argument does lead to a more general distinction in the literature between
weaker and stronger forms of republicanism. However, the issue is surely more com-
plex than a distinction between weaker and stronger variants, or even neo-Athenian
and neo-Roman variants. There are as many differences between the republicans
of the seventeenth and late twentieth century as there are between Roman repub-
licans and seventeenth-century variants. It would be true that the modern variants
no longer have a primary focus of independent property ownership in the citizen
body. Further, seventeenth-century republicanism strongly emphasises a suffocating
civic virtue, strict conditions for military service, good military arms, an underlying
deeply conservative, inertial and pessimistic demeanour, belief in universal Christian
truths and obsessive fear of institutional decay, instability, and degeneration. These
do not sit comfortably at all with modern, dare one say, more liberal republicans’
preoccupations. Thus, initially, it is difficult to speak oftheone singular republican
perspective. In point there are four generic contenders for the republican heartland:
first, classical republicans (possibly Aristotle, Cicero, Livy, and Machiavelli—unless
one separates out the Hellenic Greek, Roman, and Renaissance versions); second,
the complex seventeenth- and eighteenth-century variants (Henry Neville, Algernon
Sidney, Richard Price); third, neo-classical republicanism in the twentieth century
(Viroli, Skinner, Pettit), and, finally, late twentieth century (more neo-Athenian)
communitarian republicanism (Charles Taylor). In this more complex scenario, Vir-
oli’s or Pettit’s attempts to dismiss, for example, recent communitarianism completely
from republican ranks is not convincing.
Are there any central themes within republican political theory, which allow us
to see a more coherent picture? Many contemporary neo-classical republicans, such
as Pettit, seem more directly focused on a distinctive concept of ‘resilient negative
liberty’ (liberty as anti-power or non-dominatory liberty), as the decisive component
of republican argument. Another central theme in republican thought is the idea of
theres publicaitself, that is, the ‘public thing’. It may seem strange, on a general level,
to link republicanism and nationalism under the same broad rubric of convention-
alism. After all, as many contemporary republicans would argue, republicanism is
apparently utterly opposed to nationalism.^15 This would certainly be the case with
Pettit, Viroli, and Skinner, amongst others. However, there are two points to note here.
First, no contemporary republicans would deny an intellectual and practical discom-
fiture with procedural liberalism, a discomfiture they share withallconventionalist
writers. Thus, there is some shared ground with nationalism and communitarianism.
Second, if one focuses on what is distinctive about the opposition to nationalism or
communitarianism, then, it is clearly premised on a republican separation between
the state and the nation or community. The nation, for example, is seen to ‘pervert’
state discourse. The object, which is worthy of value and even deep respect is not
the nation, but something within the state—namely—the ‘public thing’ (res publica).