Dialogic Foundations 277which it now is liquidating’ (Horkheimer 1996: 360). Humans had become shallower
and more uni-dimensional, and societies more subtly oppressive. A more populist
analysis of the theme was also contained in Herbert Marcuse’s bookOne Dimensional
Man(1964). In summary, ‘the dwindling away of the philosophical substance, as it
were, of all the decisive ideas in the face of the seemingly victorious Enlightenment, is
one of the instances of the self-destructive trends of Reason’ (Horkheimer 1996: 363).
The real problem with this pessimistic and deeply critical analysis of Enlightenment
reason is—parallel to the postmodern critique—where to go next in political the-
ory? Critical theory, with its Marxist root, did contain the seeds of a practical and
positive intent, trying, in effect, to foster future human emancipation—although
revolution seemed primarily to be in the realm of consciousness rather than in polit-
ical action.^4 Thus, Horkheimer thought that critical theory could play an authentic
role in facilitating human self-awareness of its situation and could be constitutive
of socially-transformative activities. However, the critique of traditional social and
political theories (qua ideology critique), and the advocacy of a positively worked-
out alternative, were never fully developed by critical theorists, certainly not before
Habermas. There were admittedly strong intimations—in early critical theory—that
art or psychoanalysis might provide some way out of this exploitative situation.^5 Yet
the more overwhelming sense was negative and pessimistic, as indeed Horkheimer
commented: ‘if neither the revival of old nor the invention of new mythologies can
check the course of Enlightenment, are we not thrown into a pessimistic attitude,
a state of despair and nihilism?’. Horkheimer goes on to remark, somewhat cynic-
ally, on the ‘mortgage’ on our current thinking, namely what he calls ‘a self-imposed
obligation to arrive at a cheerful conclusion’. He continues, ‘The compulsive effort
to meet this obligation is one of the reasons why a positive conclusion is impossible.
To free Reason from the fear of being called nihilistic might be one of the steps in
its recovery’, thus, ‘One might define the self-destructive tendency of Reason in its
own conceptual realm as the positivistic dissolution of metaphysical concepts up
to the concept of Reason itself.’ Consequently, rather than paper over these deeply
pessimistic cracks, Horkheimer exhorts his readers to accept the deeply paradoxical
negative consequences (Horkheimer 1996: 366–7). We live, for Horkheimer, within a
contradictory condition. Reason seems to be permanently against itself—a constant
performative contradiction. Despite appearances, some recent commentators have
seen a quite positive agonistic vision arising from this sense of deep negativity and
contradictoriness (e.g. see, Coles in White (ed.) 1995: 34–8).
Adorno reflected on this more pessimistic contradictory theme, much more
systematically than Horkheimer. The ‘negative dimension’ was considered dialectic-
ally in his bookNegative Dialectics(1966). For Habermas, however, Adorno’sNegative
Dialectics‘reads like a continuing explanation of why we have to circle about within
thisperformative contradictionand indeed even remain there’ (Habermas 1998: 119).
Thinking, as totalizing critique, remained a strong theme throughout Adorno’s work.
In one sense, Habermas’s criticism of Adorno embodied earlier pre-1939 eman-
cipatory themes from the critical group, Adorno’s negative dialectics being seen as
a failure of critical nerve. For Habermas, Adorno remained trapped in a modern