The Nature of Political Theory

276 The Nature of Political Theory

free itself from more classical historical materialism and revolutionary communism.
In fact, the critical theory group went back self-consciously to Hegelianism for cer-
tain intellectual resources. It also showed little direct systematic interest in political
economy.
However, one of the strong prevailing themes underpinning critical theory work
was the view that the compound of instrumental reason, positivism, and natural
science-based explanatory theory had begun to dominate all areas of human cogni-
tion. In effect, this natural science-based conceptual compound, which had been used
painstakingly for the examination of the inanimate world, had been turned (quite ille-
gitimately for critical theorists) to the analysis of human action in the social, political,
and economic spheres. For the critical theorist, Max Horkheimer,

the manipulation of physical nature and of specific economic and social mechanisms demand
alike the amassing of a body of knowledge such as is supplied in an ordered set of hypotheses.
On the other hand, it made facts fruitful for the kind of scientific knowledge that would have
practical application in the circumstances, and, on the other, it made possible the application
of knowledge already possessed. (Horkheimer 1972: 194)

The origins of this conceptual compound were seen in the very beginnings of
modern philosophy, especially Cartesianism and aspects of Kantianism. Critical
theory, in general terms, set its face against this compound. This critical stance
underpinned the protracted ‘positivism debates’ of the mid-twentieth century. The
analysis of this compound—in critical theory—also owed a great deal to the work
of Max Weber and his rich sociological account of the rationalization of society.
For Weber, in modernity, both capitalism and bureaucracy embodied this one-sided
instrumental positivist sense of rationality—a rationality that contained no normat-
ive or substantive ends. Rationalization, for Weber, was seen in terms of an ‘iron cage’,
constricting substantive human reasoning.
In sum, critical theorists rejected this domination by positivist-inspired ‘instru-
mentalreason’. Theyalsosawthepotentialforthisintellectualdominanceasimminent
in the whole enterprise of the European Enlightenment. More significantly, in this
context, instrumental reason was seen to gradually undermine itself. As Habermas
noted, summarizing what he took to be Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s central position,
Enlightenment reason ‘destroys the humanity it first made possible’, consequently,
from its outset ‘the process of enlightenment is the result of a drive to self-preservation
thatmutilatesreason, becauseitlaysclaimtoitonlyintheformofapurposive-rational
mastery of nature’ (Habermas 1998: 110–14); or, as Horkheimer put it, ‘progress has
a tendency to destroy the very ideas it is supposed to realize and unfold’ (Horkheimer
1996: 359). Reason had thus become overly focused on an instrumental format, and
this, in turn, was seen to suffer from a deep affliction. Such a concept of reason
provided increased technical expertise and control, however, this control moved
in tandem with ‘deepening impotence against the concentrated power of the soci-
ety’. The technological advances of bourgeois thought and practice were inseparably
connected to this function, in the pursuit of science and instrumental reason. Con-
sequently, ‘a technical civilization has emerged from precisely that undaunted Reason