The Nature of Political Theory

302 The Nature of Political Theory

is crucial for being able to formulate scientific ‘methods’ for the study of natural or
social phenomena.
One dimension of Gadamer’s initial responses to this criticism is to suggest that false
or wrong prejudices, in fact, give rise to misunderstandings of the world. However, the
positivist criticism bites again in suggesting that it is still not clear what would actually
determine a misunderstanding, except another prejudice. Gadamer takes the edge off
this criticism by indicating that a better substitute for true and false prejudices would
be fruitful and unfruitful, or, appropriate and inappropriate prejudices. Decisive
truth or falsity is not something that can be attained in such matters—especially in the
human sciences. Gadamer also suggests that some temporal distance from a prejudice
allows us to make safer judgment about its fruitfulness or appropriateness. How-
ever, the positivist-based critic could still come back, again, with the question: what
determines the fruitfulness or appropriateness of a prejudice? Surely, Gadamer seems
to be desperately struggling not to talk about the difference between something, which
is preeminently reasonable, as against something which is prejudiced or unreasonable?
Gadamer’s response to this latter query is connected to a much more far-reaching
thesis, which is central to his magnum opus,Truth and Method. One target of the
book is ‘method’, or, ‘natural scientific method’.^11 Admittedly, his criticism is largely
directed at late nineteenth and early twentieth-century views of natural science. In
this sense, it is disappointing that there is little or no cognizance in Gadamer of
the diverse work of postpositivist theories of the sciences, in writers such as Kuhn,
Feyerabend, Hesse, or Lakatos. However, in sum, Gadamer basically wants to counter
the association of universal truth with method. His focus is on empirical science-
based method, which he (like Habermas) associates with the rise of Cartesianism
and the philosophy of the subject—a philosophy, which separates mind from matter
and subject-based reason from the objective world. As in Heidegger, Husserl, and
Habermas, Descartes is seen as one of the key foundations of twentieth century
Western thought on philosophy and science. He also sees Kant’sCritique of Pure
Reasondeveloping the deeply subtle and far-reaching epistemological defence of this
method-based perspective.
One key reason he adduces for the dominance of this ‘method’ perspective relates
to another of Kant’s works, namely, theCritique of Judgment. One initially low-key
(but none the less deeply prescient) question of this latter work is: where does the
aesthetic stand in relation to reason?^12 Kant’s notion of reason implies unity and
system (which links in closely with the idea of the ordering of our sense impres-
sion and our understanding of the physical world); second, it implies self-criticism
and self-determination (which implies controlling our practical actions under rules).
These two main functions of reason constitute ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ spheres.
This scenario places aesthetic feeling and judgment in a peculiarly complex situation.
It is neither an element of reason, nor a simple causal phenomenon related to nature.
Yet, Kant—although no great aesthete—was nonetheless aware of the important role
art played in all human activity and obviously felt an impulsion to systematize it.
For Gadamer, Kant’s response indelibly, if unwittingly, marked out the position of
knowledge within the natural and human sciences. Basically, in trying to situate