The Nature of Political Theory

62 The Nature of Political Theory

Although there are a number of variants of rational choice theory (including
Marxist rational choice), the gist of the perspective is ‘the application of the ana-
lytic method and techniques of modern economics to the study of political processes’
(Brennan 1997: 89; see also Roemer 1986; Carver and Thomas (eds.) 1995). A basic
definition of rational choice is therefore ‘the economic study of non-market decision-
making, or simply the application of economics to political science. The subject
matter of public choice is the same as that of political science: the theory of the
state, voting rules, voting behaviour, party politics, the bureaucracy, and so on. The
methodology of public choice is that of economics, however. The basic behavioural
postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational utility
maximizer’ (Mueller 1989: 1–2). In other words, it is concerned with government
or politics viewed through the market. As always happens in such theories, it has
divided fairly quickly between various schools, for example, the Virginia School of
Public Choice (associated with Buchanan and Tullock) and the Chicago school (asso-
ciated with George Stigler and Olson), sometimes referred to as the ‘private interest
regulation’ school.
The key assumptions of rational choice are fairly rigorous and parsimonious. They
are: first, the centrality of individuals for all forms of social explanation, includ-
ing groups. Thus, rational choice is methodologically individualist. Second, each
individual is assumed to be rational. Third, rationality denotes agents choosing the
‘option which they believe best fulfils their purposes’ (Brennan 1997: 98); or, as Riker
puts it, ‘that, within certain limits of available information...actors choose so as to
maximize their satisfaction’ (Riker 1990: 173). This notion of rationality is wholly
instrumental and says nothing about the contents of options or preferences.^52 A clear
analysis of basic incentives will go a long way towards explaining human behaviour.
Fourth, the individual is self-interested. This does not entail either complete egoism
or the impossibility of collective action. Far from it, for rational choice exponents,
it provides a more logically satisfying way of explaining public choice and collective
action.^53 Fifth, the actual process of rational choice is a form of decontextualized
utility maximization. Each agent is trying (rationally) to maximize their utilities and
minimize their losses. Faced with a number of options, the agent will pick one which
best serves or maximizes efficiently her objectives. Essentially we are looking at the
integuments of, what is often referred to as,homo economicus. Rational choice also
assumes that there will be a consistency in choices and options; preferences will be
ranked according to their utility for us. This constitutes a basic equilibrium. Thus,
from any collection of preferences, the agent is able to calculate a choice from which
she can expect the greatest utility payoff. This particular line of reasoning has led
many rational choice theories into ‘game theory’ and various forms of mathemat-
ical modelling. Finally, all rational choice analysis shows ‘a predilection for formal
deductive method, deriving ‘interesting’ (i.e. non-obvious, often counter intuitive)
propositions via sometimes long and complex chains of logical reasoning from a
minimal set of plausible axioms’ (Brennan 1997: 96). These assumptions of rational
choice are considered to be universal, empirical (in the sense that they form the basis
for testable research programmes), and scientifically orientated. Indeed, even some