sory memory: Goff and Roediger, 1998. Source monitoring problems: Mitchell and
Johnson, 2000. Illustration with cross-modality illusory memory: Henkel, Franklin
and Johnson, 2000. Confirmation bias: Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972; in scientists:
Mynatt, Doherty and Tweney, 1977. Cognitive dissonance: Festinger, Riecken and
Schachter, 1956.
- Religious experience: James, 1972. On persistence of this stance: Taves, 1999.
- Survey of psychology of religious experience: Argyle, 1990. On some variants of
Buddhism as influenced by Western preoccupation with experience: Sharf, 1998. - Survey of special experience and religion: Bourguignon, 1973; of neuropsycho-
logical evidence: Newberg and D'Aquili, 1998. Self awareness and religious feelings:
Craik et al., 1999. Neurophysiology of near-death and out-of-body experience:
Persinger, 1995; Persinger, 1999. - Factors relevant to individual belief: see the summary in Baston et al., 1993, pp. [341]
81-115. - Modern conditions do not require a more rational or scientific outlook: Gell-
ner, 1992; science as unnatural: Wolpert, 1992; "naturalness" of religion and "unnatu-
ralness" of science: McCauley, 2000. - Liberation scenarios: Donald, 1991. Perspective-taking as crucial, Tomasello,
Kruger and Ratner, 1993. Flexibility of modular architecture: Mithen, 1996; general
discussion: Boyer, 1998.
NOTES