supposed god is thereexemplifies.”^12 Does the abstract formalization necessarily infer from
an extremely general hypothesis? I think it does, in particular when the
term “God” is taken in its most general meaning. Derrida is playing
with the Name of God and thus extending the space between alterity
and subjectivity.
First Reading: I Call Myself God
Let me therefore draw attention to a passage in Chapter Four of The
Gift of Death where Derrida discusses the distinction between alterity
and subjectivity in an exemplary manner. It is a passage that is typical
for the later Derrida insofar as he gives a detailed account of the
concept and the name of God as a name for ab-solute alterity. In order
to distinguish different layers, I will suggest three readings of the same
passage; according to its non-sense, its con-sense, and its dis-sense.
Derrida’s point of departure is Matt. 6, where Jesus talks about giv-
ing gifts in secret so that the Father who sees in secret will reward you.
He criticizes the promise of reward, since the gift thereby becomes
inscribed in a retributive economy, but he embraces the radical interi-
orization of thinking God. He even goes one step further and will
sacrifice any thought of God as “someone,” up there, or transcendent,
who might see the most secret interior places. He suggests an alterna-
tive definition, running as follows: “God is the name of the possibil-
ity I have of keeping a secret (la possibilité pour moi de garder un secret)
that is visible from the interior but not from the exterior.”^13
This is perhaps a possible definition or re-definition of “God,” but
it does not strike me as a very good one. Secrets may of course be kept
in the name of God, but just as well in any other name. God may be
seen as a condition of possibility for keeping secrets at all, but I must
admit I am not convinced about the importance of this qualification.
Taken as a definition that is supposed to replace other definitions and
images (“idolatrous or iconoclastic simplisms”) of God, it is certainly
questionable. Hence, this is where I find it necessary to draw a first
line of separation from the deconstructive approach of Derrida.
- Derrida, On the Name, 76.
- Derrida, Gift of Death, 108; Donner la mort, 147.