on the side of Kissinger. In later Congressional testimony Ray Cline, a wheelhorse of the
Bush faction of the CIA, has tried to argue that Rogers and Bush were kept in the dark by
Nixon and Kissinger about the real nature of the US China policy. The implication is that
Bush's efforts to keep Taiwan at the UN were in good faith. According to Cline's fantastic
account, "Nixon and Kissinger actually 'undermined' the department's efforts in 1971 to
save Taiwan." [fn 10] Rogers may have believed that helping Taiwan was US policy, but
Bush did not. Cline's version of these events is an insult to the intelligence of any serious
person.
The Nixon era China card took shape during July, 1971 with Kissinger's "Operation
Marco Polo I," his secret first trip to Peking. Kissinger says in his memoirs that Bush was
considered a candidate to make this journey, along with David Bruce, Elloit Richardson,
Nelson Rockefeller, and Al Haig. [fn 11] Kissinger first journeyed to India, and then to
Pakistan. From there, with the help of Yahya Khan, Kissinger went on to Beijing for
meetings with Chou En-Lai and other Chinese officals. He returned by way of Paris,
where he met with North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho at the Paris talks on Indo-
China. Returning to Washington, Kissinger briefed Nixon on his understanding with
Chou. On July 15, 1971 Nixon announced to a huge telvision and radio audience that he
had accepted "with pleasure" an invitation to visit China at some occasion before May of
- He lamely assured "old friends" (meaning Chiang Kai-Shek and the ROC
government on Taiwan) that their interests would not be sacrificed. Later in he same year,
between October 16th and 26th, Kissinger undertook operation "Polo II," a second,
public visit with Chou in Peking to decide the details of Nixon's visit and hammer out
what was to become the US-PRC Shanghai Communique', the joint statement issued
during Nixon's stay. During this visit Chou cautioned Kissinger not to be disoriented by
the hostile Peking propaganda line against the US, manifestations of which were
everywhere to be seen. Anti-US slogans on the walls, said Chou, were meaningless, like
"firing an empty cannon." Nixon and Kissinger eventually journeyed to Peking in
February, 1972.
It was before this backdrop that Bush waged his farcical campaign to keep Taiwan in the
UN. The State Department had stated through the mouth of Rogers on August 2 that the
US would support the admission of Red China to the UN, but would oppose the
expulsion of Taiwan. This was the so-called "two Chinas" policy. In an August 12
interview, Bush told the Washington Post that he was working hard to line up the votes to
keep Taiwan as a UN member when the time to vote came in the fall. Responding to the
obvious impression that this was a fraud for domestic political purposes only, Bush
pledged his honor on Nixon's committment to "two Chinas.""I know for a fact that the
President wants to see the policy implemented," said Bush, apparently with a straight
face, adding that he had discussed the matter with Nixon and Kissinger at the White
House only a few days before. Bush said that he and other members of his mission had
lobbied 66 countries so far, and that this figure was likely to rise to 80 by the following
week. Ultimately Bush would claim to have talked personlly with 94 delegations to get
them to let Taiwan stay, which a fellow diplomat called "a quantitative track record."