A Treatise of Human Nature

BOOK II PART II except in very obvious instances. Yet it is easy to remark, that on some occasions it has a con- siderable influ ...

BOOK II PART II cated from one animal to another, without their knowledge of that cause, which produced the original passion. Gr ...

BOOK II PART II dogs are animated when they hunt in a pack, than when they pursue their game apart; and it is evident this can p ...

PART III OF THEWILL ANDDIRECTPASSIONS SECTIONI. OFLIBERTY ANDNECESSITY We come now to explain the direct passions, or the impres ...

BOOK II PART III desire it may be observed, that by the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscio ...

BOOK II PART III their attraction, and mutual cohesion, there are nor the least traces of indifference or liberty. Every object ...

BOOK II PART III gle instance the ultimate connexion of any ob- jects is discoverable, either by our senses or rea- son, and tha ...

BOOK II PART III edge a necessity. As the actions of matter have no necessity, but what is derived from these cir- cumstances, a ...

BOOK II PART III To this end a very slight and general view of the common course of human affairs will be sufficient. There is n ...

BOOK II PART III ent than the sentiments, actions, and passions of the two sexes, of which the one are distin- guished by their ...

BOOK II PART III like principles; and our reason in the latter case, is better than even that in the former; be- cause we not on ...

BOOK II PART III of quality: So are his sentiments, actions and manners. The different stations of life influence the whole fabr ...

BOOK II PART III fruits ripen and come to perfection in the win- ter, and decay in the summer, after the same manner as in Engla ...

BOOK II PART III I can imagine only one way of eluding this argument, which is by denying that uniformity of human actions, on w ...

BOOK II PART III ceeds not from the other. To this I reply, that in judging of the ac- tions of men we must proceed upon the sam ...

BOOK II PART III but supposing that the usual contrariety pro- ceeds from the operation of contrary and con- cealed causes, we c ...

BOOK II PART III than the actions of wise-men, and consequently are farther removed from necessity. Our way of thinking in this ...

BOOK II PART III out a manifest absurdity, attribute necessity to the one, and refuse into the other. There is no philosopher, w ...

BOOK II PART III terest, would never conspire to deceive us; es- pecially since they must, in the attempt, expose themselves to ...

BOOK II PART III cerning them. Now I assert, that whoever rea- sons after this manner, does ipso facto believe the actions of th ...