A Treatise of Human Nature

BOOK II PART III creased by the nature of the objects, which be- ing sensible, and of a narrow compass, are en- tered into with ...

BOOK II PART III formation; in which case there is no room for study or application. Let us search for the rea- son of this phae ...

BOOK II PART III change is unpleasant to us, and that however any objects may in themselves be indifferent, yet their alteration ...

BOOK II PART III has lived any considerable time among them, he acquires the same curiosity as the natives. When we are reading ...

BOOK III OFMORALS ...

PART I OFVIRTUE ANDVICE INGENERAL FROM REASON SECTIONI. MORALDISTINCTIONS NOT DERIVED FROMREASON There is an inconvenience which ...

BOOK III PART I we had attained with difficulty. This is still more conspicuous in a long chain of reason- ing, where we must pr ...

BOOK III PART I engaged on the one side or the other, we nat- urally think that the question lies within hu- man comprehension; ...

BOOK III PART I that term is no less applicable to those judg- ments, by which we distinguish moral good and evil, than to every ...

BOOK III PART I a conformity to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every ...

BOOK III PART I would be more fruitless than that multitude of rules and precepts, with which all moralists abound. Philosophy i ...

BOOK III PART I cite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this par- ticular. The ru ...

BOOK III PART I It would be tedious to repeat all the argu- ments, by which I have proved (Book II. Part III. Sect 3.), that rea ...

BOOK III PART I litions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being origi- nal facts and real ...

BOOK III PART I laudable or blameable; but they cannot be rea- sonable: Laudable or blameable, therefore, are not the same with ...

BOOK III PART I losophy will scarce allow of, the same contrari- ety may, upon that account, be ascribed to the action. How far ...

BOOK III PART I pain or pleasure to lie in an object, which has no tendency to produce either of these sensa- tions, or which pr ...

BOOK III PART I fectly involuntary. I am more to be lamented than blamed, if I am mistaken with regard to the influence of objec ...

BOOK III PART I And here it may be proper to observe, that if moral distinctions be derived from the truth or falshood of those ...

BOOK III PART I right often is; and that this may be the source of immorality: I would answer, that it is im- possible such a mi ...