A Treatise of Human Nature

BOOK III PART II according to all the different degrees, which can be imagined, there will result many cases, where the reasons ...

BOOK III PART II another, or a ship from his wood, and suppose the proprietor of the metal or wood shoued de- mand his goods, th ...

BOOK III PART II observing, that the decision of Trebonian seems to me pretty ingenious; that the cup belongs to the proprietor ...

BOOK III PART II ous and frugal. Perhaps these causes are sec- onded by the influence of relation, or the as- sociation of ideas ...

BOOK III PART II SECTIONIV. OF THETRANSFERENCE OF PROPERTY BYCONSENT However useful, or even necessary, the sta- bility of posse ...

BOOK III PART II it is attended with very considerable incon- veniences. The relation of fitness or suitable- ness ought never t ...

BOOK III PART II twixt a rigid stability, and this changeable and uncertain adjustment. But there is no medium better than that ...

BOOK III PART II as well as its stability without such a consent. So far is determined by a plain utility and interest. But perh ...

BOOK III PART II one person to another is a more remarkable event, the defect of our ideas becomes more sensible on that occasio ...

BOOK III PART II the real one is impracticable. Thus the giving the keys of a granary is understood to be the delivery of the co ...

BOOK III PART II SECTIONV. OF THEOBLIGATION OF PROMISES That the rule of morality, which enjoins the performance of promises, is ...

BOOK III PART II be some act of the mind attending these words, I promise; and on this act of the mind must the obligation depen ...

BOOK III PART II ing any particular performance, it must neces- sarily be the willing of that obligation, which arises from the ...

BOOK III PART II mance of it, displeases us after a like manner, we say that we lie under an obligation to per- form it. A chang ...

BOOK III PART II is there any act of the mind belonging to it^21 Shou’d it be said, that this act of the will be- ing in effect ...

BOOK III PART II new relation of objects were form’d by the voli- tion itself, we should in effect will the volition; which is p ...

BOOK III PART II duce any obligation. This appears evidently from the foregoing reasoning. A promise cre- ates a new obligation. ...

BOOK III PART II any natural obligation; since it may be omit- ted without proving any defect or imperfec- tion in the mind and ...

BOOK III PART II clination to observe promises, distinct from a sense of their obligation; it follows, that fidelity is no natur ...

BOOK III PART II Men being naturally selfish, or endowed only with a confined generosity, they are not easily induced to perform ...