BOOK I PART III
resolve themselves into the first, and are noth-
ing but particular ways of conceiving our ob-
jects. Whether we consider a single object, or
several; whether we dwell on these objects, or
run from them to others; and in whatever form
or order we survey them, the act of the mind
exceeds not a simple conception; and the only
remarkable difference, which occurs on this oc-
casion, is, when we join belief to the concep-
tion, and are persuaded of the truth of what we
conceive. This act of the mind has never yet
been explaind by any philosopher; and there-
fore I am at liberty to propose my hypothesis
concerning it; which is, that it is only a strong
and steady conception of any idea, and such as
approaches in some measure to an immediate
impression.^5
(^5) Here are the heads of those arguments, which lead