BOOK I PART IV
But here, perhaps, it may be demanded, how
it happens, even upon my hypothesis, that
these arguments above-explained produce not
a total suspense of judgment, and after what
manner the mind ever retains a degree of as-
surance in any subject? For as these new prob-
abilities, which by their repetition perpetually
diminish the original evidence, are founded on
the very same principles, whether of thought
or sensation, as the primary judgment, it may
seem unavoidable, that in either case they must
equally subvert it, and by the opposition, ei-
ther of contrary thoughts or sensations, reduce
the mind to a total uncertainty. I suppose, there
is some question proposed to me, and that af-
ter revolving over the impressions of my mem-
ory and senses, and carrying my thoughts from
them to such objects, as are commonly con-
joined with them, I feel a stronger and more