BOOK I PART IV
But though we are led after this manner, by
the natural propensity of the imagination, to
ascribe a continued existence to those sensible
objects or perceptions, which we find to resem-
ble each other in their interrupted appearance;
yet a very little reflection and philosophy is suf-
ficient to make us perceive the fallacy of that
opinion. I have already observed, that there is
an intimate connexion betwixt those two prin-
ciples, of a continued and of a distinct or inde-
pendent existence, and that we no sooner es-
tablish the one than the other follows, as a nec-
essary consequence. It is the opinion of a con-
tinued existence, which first takes place, and
without much study or reflection draws the
other along with it, wherever the mind follows
its first and most natural tendency. But when
we compare experiments, and reason a little
upon them, we quickly perceive, that the doc-