BOOK I PART IV
We entertain a like notion with regard to the
simplicity of substances, and from like causes.
Suppose an object perfectly simple and indivis-
ible to be presented, along with another object,
whose co-existent parts are connected together
by a strong relation, it is evident the actions
of the mind, in considering these two objects,
are not very different. The imagination con-
ceives the simple object at once, with facility,
by a single effort of thought, without change or
variation. The connexion of parts in the com-
pound object has almost the same effect, and
so unites the object within itself, that the fancy
feels not the transition in passing from one part
to another. Hence the colour, taste, figure, so-
lidity, and other qualities, combined in a peach
or melon, are conceived to form one thing; and
that on account of their close relation, which
makes them affect the thought in the same