BOOK I PART IV
than thinking, that a mode, not being any dis-
tinct or separate existence, must be the very
same with its substance, and consequently the
extension of the universe, must be in a manner
identifyed with that, simple, uncompounded
essence, in which the universe is supposed to
inhere. But this, it may be pretended, is utterly
impossible and inconceivable unless the indi-
visible substance expand itself, so as to corre-
spond to the extension, or the extension con-
tract itself, so as to answer to the indivisible
substance. This argument seems just, as far as
we can understand it; and it is plain nothing
is required, but a change in the terms, to ap-
ply the same argument to our extended percep-
tions, and the simple essence of the soul; the
ideas of objects and perceptions being in every
respect the same, only attended with the sup-
position of a difference, that is unknown and