BOOK II PART I
ternal obstacle to his actions; but also that he
may punish or reward me as he pleases, with-
out any dread of punishment in his turn, I then
attribute a full power to him, and consider my-
self as his subject or vassal.
Now if we compare these two cases, that of
a person, who has very strong motives of in-
terest or safety to forbear any action, and that
of another, who lies under no such obligation,
we shall find, according to the philosophy ex-
plained in the foregoing book, that the only
known difference betwixt them lies in this, that
in the former case we conclude from past ex-
perience, that the person never will perform
that action, and in the latter, that he possibly
or probably will perform it. Nothing is more
fluctuating and inconstant on many occasions,
than the will of man; nor is there any thing but