BOOK II PART I
regard the real existence of objects, and we al-
ways judge of this reality from past instances;
nothing can be more likely of itself, without
any farther reasoning, than that power consists
in the possibility or probability of any action,
as discovered by experience and the practice of
the world.
Now it is evident, that wherever a person
is in such a situadon with regard to me, that
there is no very powerful motive to deter him
from injuring me, and consequently it is uncer-
tain whether he will injure me or not, I must
be uneasy in such a situation, and cannot con-
sider the possibility or probability of that in-
jury without a sensible concern. The passions
are not only affected by such events as are cer-
tain and infallible, but also in an inferior degree
by such as are possible and contingent. And