Chapter dzǷ: Free Will and Ethics ȁȈȆthat his work on it, and others’ reactions to it, are fated to turn out exactly
as they do.
Ļis determinist position, then, may not be downright inconsistent
with itself, not downright self-refuting. Rather, it is practically incredible.
ŠŔő şőŘŒ-ŞőŒőŞőŚŠŕōŘ ŜŞśŎŘőř śŒ ŐőŠőŞřŕŚŕşř
Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen (ȀȈȆȅ) expose
the self-contradictory position of one who “rationally affirms” full deter-
minism or, as they say, denies that anyone has any “free choice.” (To “ratio-
nally affirm” a proposition goes beyond merely mentioning it or consider-
ing it possible; it means holding that it is true or at least more reasonably
acceptable than its contradictory.) A philosopher who argues that persons
interested in the issue ought rationally to accept the no-free-choice posi-
tion must believe that although they are not compelled to accept it, they
canrationally accept it (“ought implies can”); they have some freedom of
choice in the matter. Yet the determinist proposition being urged denies
that the persons addressed have any freedom. Either the determinist is
thus contradicting himself or else is pointlessly urging people to do what
by his own doctrine they cannot do—make the free choice of rationally
accepting that doctrine.
Boyle and his coauthors do in effect recognize the possibility, men-
tioned in the preceding section, that determinism is true and that partici-
pants in controversy over it versus free choice are behaving like fully pro-
grammed robots whose every slightest verbal move in the game is a fully
determined rather than rationally chosen action. “To affirm [the determin-
ist] position in this way, however, is to withdraw from the philosophical
controversy” (p.ȀȅȈ).ȅ
ŠŔő પőŒšŠōŎŕŘ੻ śŒ ŐőŠőŞřŕŚŕşř
Besides being practically incredible and besides putting its proponents
in the position of either contradicting themselves or avowing themselves
to be mere robots rather than rational controversialists, determinism is
irrefutable or unfalsifiable—in the bad sense. It has a built-in immunity
to any adverse evidence; its claim to say anything definite about how
ȅĻe argument of Boyle et al. is extremely complex, detailed, and repetitious, contains
many cross-references and other obstacles to comprehension, and does, after all, occupy an
entire book; so I cannot guarantee that my summary is entirely faithful to their argument.