Ȃȁȅ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophywithin particular frameworks of information, incentives, tests of perfor-
mance, and rewards.ȅEconomists, long successful with methodological
individualism in their own field, are now applying that approach to under-
standing how people behave in the governmental framework. We, the ana-
lysts, project ourselves into the role of businessman, consumer, bureaucrat,
legislator, political candidate, or whoever it is whose decisions and actions
we are trying to understand. We consider his motivations and incentives,
perhaps even including the circumstances affecting his self-esteem, as well
as the opportunities and constraints he faces. We can draw relevant infor-
mation from our own personal thoughts, actions, and experiences. Such
an approach does not depend on the profundities of psychology. It draws
inferences from familiar facts about human nature and about decisionmak-
ing situations.
ŏŕŞŏšřşŠōŚŏőş ōŚŐ ŕŐőōş śŒ ŠŔő ōŢőŞōœő ŢśŠőŞ
Ļe “average voter” is the voter considered at random, otherwise than as
a member of any special interest group. (To take account ofnonvoting,
perhaps the term should be “average citizen.”) He does not automatically
possess the information needed to weigh the pros and cons of more or less
spending on each special group’s favorite project. Furthermore, obtaining
such information would cost him money, time, and trouble better devoted
to other purposes. He profits more from a day spent learning the strong
and weak points of different makes of car or refrigerator, when he wants
to buy a new one, than from a day spent trying to learn the advantages
and disadvantages of increased government spending on aircraft carriers
or urban renewal.
Acquiring and acting on information about public issues has a low
payoff because it is a “public good.” Ļe standard rationale for having any
government at all is that it is necessary to provide public goods, such as
national defense, police protection, and the legal system. Ļeir benefits
cannot be confined to people who voluntarily contribute money or effort
for them. Each person might as well sit back and enjoy a free ride onȅKenneth N. Waltz makes an analogous point, which illuminates this one, in his
Ļeory of International Politics(ȀȈȆȈ). Almost regardless of the internal character of its
regime, we can say much about how a country behaves in the arena of international politics
in view of the situation confronting it—in particular, according to whether or not it is a
dominant power and, if it is, whether it is one of several or one of only two dominant
powers.