Chapter ǴDz: Civic Religion Reasserted ȂȅȈfor the allegation that “diffuse taxpayers” are insensitive to spending for
concentrated interests, well, uninformed people may even exaggerate the
extent and harm of pork-barrel projects. Even if some voters do make
incorrect choices, the law of large numbers is likely to yield the correct
majority choice anyway. Political institutions, including legislatures much
smaller than the constituencies represented, reduce transactions costs and
facilitate efficient policy deals. Despite supposed problems of transitiv-
ity, externalities, localism, and pressure groups, efforts to gain a majority
push a government toward achieving efficient outcomes. Local zoning,
for example, is likely to be efficient.
Here are three more examples of Wittman’s style of argument.(Ȁ)Do
voters shift some of the burden of current government spending onto
future generations through debt-financed deficits? Ļree short sentences
assuming that taxes fall on land introduce a sweeping conclusion: “Ļe
burden of the debt falls on the present generation, and they will there-
fore choose the optimal discount rate, just as they choose the optimal
policy in other areas” (p.ȀȄȈ).(ȁ)“[E]fficient economic markets constrain
the behavior of democratic markets. If vote-maximizing politicians try
to monkey with the economy, it backfires—the economy becomes less
efficient, and workers and capitalists vote them out of office. So politi-
cians are restrained from such maneuvers in the first place” (p.ȀȆȅ).(Ȃ)In
making consumption-versus-investment decisions in a socialist economy,
“Vote-maximizing politicians would again be constrained in their choices
by requirements of an efficient economy. Making different choices would
ultimately yield fewer votes” (p.ȀȆȅ). “Ultimately”—perhaps so, if free-
dom and democracy survive under socialism; but why should the individ-
ual politician care about “ultimately”?
Wittman provides little sustained reasoning to support his positions,
and scant evidence beyond airy references to the existence of elections,
parties, ideologies, rivalries, campaigning, Congressional hearings, and so
forth. He does cite many books and articles claimed to support his posi-
tion, but he cites them sweepingly, without detailed discussion. He spends
more space on the supposed methodological and other flaws of studies
that reach contrary conclusions. One whole chapter criticizes psycholog-
ical studies casting doubt on how dependably people behave “rationally”
as economists understand the term.
Wittman pays little or no attention to major strands of public-choice
literature. While he does paw away at the concept of voter ignorance,
he seems not deeply to appreciate why superficiality is rational for the