Chapter ǴǷ: Mises and His Critics on Ethics, Rights, and Law ȃȁȄrightly or wrongly, to Nietzsche). Or instead of taking the “happiness”
of people in general as the criterion of institutions and precepts and so
forth, one might conceivably urge the happiness of oneself or some other
specific person.
Ļat these alternatives are conceivable shows that the utilitarian crite-
rion is not vacuous, while their implausibility strengthens its own appeal.
As a practical matter, furthermore, utilitarianism does not hinge on any
exactspelling out of its fundamental value judgment. Its fulfillment is
served by social cooperation—a well-functioning network of beneficial
relations among individuals. Institutions, precepts, and so forth may be
appraised according to how they support or subvert this crucial means to
happiness, without constant appeal to any precise interpretation of “hap-
piness” itself.
With characteristic bluntness, Mises denies that utilitarian philoso-
phy has anything to do with the doctrine of natural rights. He has a point:
respect for rights is ill served by a faulty defense. Rights are not merely
conferred by government; rather, they derive from ethical precepts, which
in turn have a rational underpinning. Utilitarianism, Mises says, recom-
mends “popular government, private property, tolerance, and freedom
not because they are natural and just, but because they are beneficial....
[S]ocial cooperation and division of labor ... is beneficial.” With appar-
ent approval, Mises quotes Bentham: “Natural rightsis simple nonsense:
natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense.” In investigating
what ought to be right, Bentham “does not care about preconceived ideas
concerning God’s or nature’s plans and intentions, forever hidden to mor-
tal men; he is intent upon discovering what best serves the promotion of
human welfare and happiness” (ȀȈȃȈ/ȀȈȅȂ, p.ȀȆȃ).
Mises occasionally slipped into repeating slogans about “the greatest
happiness for the greatest number” (ȀȈȀȈ/ȀȈȇȂ, p.ȀȇȂ). Such a formulation,
taken literally, has no precise meaning, of course. All that Mises presum-
ably meant by it is that the happiness to be furthered by social institu-
tions and practices is the happiness of people in general—of the member
of society chosen at random, in F.A. Hayek’s formulation (HayekȀȈȅȆ,
p.ȀȅȂ; HayekȀȈȆȅ, pp.ȀȁȈ–ȀȂǿ)—rather than the differential happiness
of specific persons or classes. Mises specifically repudiated any numer-
ical utilitarianism such as critics enjoy attacking. He denied that “it is
the task of economics to establish how in the whole of society the great-
est possible satisfaction of all people or of the greatest number could be
attained.... [T]here is no method which would allow us to measure the