ȃȃȃ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophyunintended consequences. Economic ignorance is so widespread and its
consequences so frightening that, as Kirzner said, reducing it “becomes a
goal invested with independent moral worth.” Economic education serves
a human goal of such importance that “passionate concern becomes ... a
morally natural phenomenon.” Kirzner insists on “a fundamental differ-
ence between economic education” and promoting “‘libertarian’ ideology
or rhetoric.” Passion need not and dare not “compromise the detachment
and objectivity of thecontentof ... economic education” (ȀȈȈȇ, pp.Ȅȇȁ–Ȅȇȅ).
I will make one clarification. We cannot expect the whole of any sci-
ence to be value-free and expect researchers to pursue their work with
no heed to values. Values guide scientists toward questions that they find
interesting and worth investigating. Values guide the application of scien-
tific findings. Whatcanbe value-free is thecontentof scientific proposi-
tions. Ļe distinction between value-free and value-loaded pertains not to
whole fields of study or to professional careers but to propositions, to sen-
tences. Some value-free propositions are that snow is white, that demand
curves slope downward, that expanding the quantity of money beyond
what people are willing to hold at existing prices causes price inflation,
and that private property and genuine markets are necessary (as Mises
and Hayek explained) for economic calculation.
Does insisting on a distinction between normative and positive propo-
sitions disparage ethics? No. Normative propositions can be argued for
and against. All value judgments have descriptive as well as normative con-
tent, except only for fundamental value judgments. Examples of relatively
specific judgments are that lying, cheating, and stealing are wrong. A fun-
damental judgment, in contrast and by definition, is one that one cannot
argue for because one has reached the end of arguing and must appeal to
direct observation or intuition instead. Probably the most familiar example
is the judgment that misery is bad and happiness is good; scarcely anyone
would try todemonstratethat judgment.
šŠŕŘŕŠōŞŕōŚŕşř
Utilitarianism rests on that one fundamental intuition or, in other words,
on approval of human flourishing, of people’s success in making good lives
for themselves, and disapproval of the opposite conditions. Ļis is a tame
value judgment, to be sure; but combined with positive knowledge of the
world and human affairs, it goes a long way in ethics. What fundamental
value judgment or criterion could be more plausible?