ȃȆȃ Partʺʺ: Politics and PhilosophyHere I have admittedly drifted into considering the possiblemotives
of the egalitarians. Questioning motives is often bad form. It is rank anti-
intellectualism, in particular, to dismiss purportedly factual or logical prop-
ositions by a mere sneer at the alleged motives of their propounders. But
when policy goals and conceptions of the good society are at issue, motives
are at the core of the discussion. If we ask why someone advocates cer-
tain policies, the reason is that we are trying to understand his conception
of the good society. Ļe tastes gratified by leveling policies—the taste
for making a goal out of the social and economic game itself, the taste
for smugly passing judgment on other persons, the taste for sheer med-
dling—clash with the spirit of liberalism.
Am I denying that liberalism accords equal esteem to all tastes of
individuals, regardless of what they are? Should liberalism discriminate
between worthy and unworthy tastes, ones that “ought” and others that
“ought not” to count in a liberal social order? Yes. As a conception of the
good society, liberalism cannot, with consistency, give its blessing to all
kinds of taste, indifferent to the kind of society that emerges in response. If
social philosophy has any role at all, it is to investigate and promote consen-
sus about what social institutions and policies and attitudes are conducive
to human happiness. Its job is to paint a coherent picture of the good
society. It cannot just offer a ticket instead of a picture, a ticket reading
that the good society looks like whatever a substantially unanimous opin-
ion thinks it looks like. Ļere may be no substantially unanimous opin-
ion. Prevalent opinion may be unenlightened. Social philosophy shirks its
job when it offers no positive guidance. Quite properly, de Tocqueville
and John Stuart Mill inveighed in the name of liberalism not only against
governmental tyranny but also against the conformist pressures of public
opinion.
Suppose one man were to buy the fawning submissiveness of another,
or even the other’s submission to torture, to gratify the sadism of the first.
Can liberalism bless such transactions in the name of the free market? Of
course not. Voluntary though they may be, they gratify and encourage atti-
tudes subversive of an enduring liberal social order. Practical reasons, to
be sure, tell against making them illegal. On the other hand, public pol-
icy should not provide examples that sanctify tyrannical and meddlesome
private tastes. Policymakers should recognize that State actions today may
well influence what private attitudes prevail tomorrow.
Does liberalism sanctify illiberal practices freely agreed upon? Does
tolerance include toleration of intolerance? Does democracy imply the