ȃȇȅ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophytruth. Implicitly they claim the right to impose truth on persons mired in
error (ȀȈȆȆ, pp.Ȇȅ–ȆȆ). Ļeir view entails
a demonstrated willingness to impose nonvoluntary changes on the exist-
ing pattern of entitlements in social order.... Once truth is found, there
is no moral argument to be raised against its implementation. Consent is
meaningless in this context. Opposition can be variously characterized as
stemming from ignorance, folly, or the exercise of selfish interest. In any
case, the views of those who actively oppose the truth-carrying zealots
are not treated as worthy of respect. And any requirement to compro-
mise with such views arises only because the reformists might otherwise
lack the power to impose “truth” unilaterally. (ȀȈȆȆ, pp.ȀȃȂ–Ȁȃȃ)Buchanan (ȀȈȆȄa, p.ȀȅȆ) sees many social philosophers exhibiting
intellectual and moral arrogance. An attempt to describe the social good
in detail seems to carry with it an implied willingness to impose this
good, independently of observed or prospective agreement among per-
sons. By contrast, [his] natural proclivity as an economist is to place
ultimate value on process or procedure, and by implication to define as
“good” that which emerges from agreement among free men, indepen-
dently of intrinsic evaluation of the outcome itself.Passages abound in which Buchanan dwells on this theme of the arro-
gance, the itch to play God, of those who presume to employ their own
value judgments in trying to frame a coherent conception of a good society.
For contractarians, process and consent, not outcome or substance,
form the criterion of goodness or desirability in human institutions and
relations. “‘Truth,’ in the final analysis, is tested by agreement. And if men
disagree, there is no ‘truth’” (ȀȈȆȆ, p.ȀȀȂ). “A scientist may advance an
argument to the effect that a proposition is ‘true.’ His argument ... may
succeed in establishing a consensus among his fellow scientists. But the
‘truth’ of the proposition emerges only from this agreement and not from
some original objective reality” (ȀȈȆȆ, p.ȀȃȄn.).
ōšŠŔśŞŕŠōŞŕōŚŕşř, ŞőŘōŠŕŢŕşř, ŒōŘŘŕŎŕŘŕşř
Ļis extreme relativism is remarkable, yet Buchanan finds adopting it nec-
essary to avoid authoritarianism with regard to truth. Actually, these are
not the only alternatives.
Harry Davis (ȀȈȅȆ–ȀȈȅȇ) has described a third position distinct from
the two between which Buchanan evidently thinks the choice must lie.