276 Social Cognition
attention, memory, and interpretation, the world can be seen
as a flattering, safe, desirable place. These positive biases
may provide important coping resources for us (Taylor &
Brown, 1988). However, it is important to recognize there are
always some reality constraints in operation when we per-
ceive the social environment. It is only when a suitable justi-
fication can be constructed that the perceiver is free to
indulge in these positive illusions. Given the typical degree
of ambiguity in social reality and the range of motivational
strategies that are available, it may only rarely be the case
that reality constraints are completely impervious to the dis-
torting influence of defensive motives.
Social-Adjustive Motivation
The need for belonging and interpersonal acceptance is an-
other powerful motivational force acting on social perceivers,
as decades of research on normative social influence have
documented (e.g., Baron, Kerr, & Miller, 1992). A major im-
plication of this body of research is that social perceivers will
be motivated to perceive the world in ways that win them ac-
ceptance and approval and that make them feel like worthy
members of their social groups. One major component of this
tendency is simple conformity to the impressions and judg-
ments of others. For instance, hearing information that con-
dones or criticizes prejudice can influence the types of
attitudes that an individual expresses (e.g., Blanchard, Lilly, &
Vaughn, 1991). One might argue that such an effect merely re-
flects simple compliance with clear situational demands and
does not necessarily reflect motivated distortion of the per-
son’s true inner judgments and impressions. However, similar
findings have emerged even when relevant social norms are
activated in very subtle and indirect ways, and when there is
no audience that will be aware of whether the person con-
formed or failed to conform to the apparent social consensus
(Wittenbrink & Henley, 1996).
There is also interesting evidence that belongingness
needs can direct social attention and memory. Gardner,
Pickett, and Brewer (2000) had participants engage in inter-
actions in a computer chat room. The nature of the interaction
was manipulated so that the participants would have social
acceptance or rejection experiences. Following social rejec-
tion, belongingness needs were expected to be activated and
to guide subsequent information processing. After the chat
room experience, all participants read a diary that contained
information about both social and individual events. As ex-
pected, in a subsequent memory task, the individuals who had
experienced exclusion in the chat room were significantly
more likely to remember the social information contained in
the diary. This finding confirms the long-standing claim that
the momentary needs and goals of the person are likely to
play an important directive role in social cognition (e.g.,
Bruner, 1957; Jones & Thibaut, 1958; Klinger, 1975). The
pursuit of belonging is just one of many possible goals that
can serve this directive function, and a recent focus of empir-
ical attention has been on the mechanisms through which
goals guide cognition down a path toward desired outcomes
(e.g., Bargh & Barndollar, 1996; Gollwitzer, 1990).Affective StatesThe study of emotion is intimately tied up with the study of
motivation. Just as the perceiver’s motives can influence the
extent and direction of social cognition, so too do affective
states play a regulatory role in shaping the course of social in-
formation processing. Moods and other emotional states can
direct memory toward affectively congruent material (e.g.,
Forgas, 1995), influence which dimensions and attributes
of objects are salient (e.g., Niedenthal, Halberstadt, &
Innes-Ker, 1999), and lead perceivers to interpret ambiguous
social stimuli in a manner that is consistent with the implica-
tions of their affect (e.g., Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards,
1993). Affective states can influence the perceived likelihood
of events (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983) and can them-
selves be used as information directing judgments when per-
ceivers interpret their affect as being a reaction to the object
of judgment (e.g., Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994).
In keeping with major themes of the present review, affec-
tive and arousal states have also been hypothesized to influ-
ence attentional capacity and epistemic motivation. Thus,
they may play a role in determining the extent to which social
impressions are based primarily on relatively automatic,
immediate reactions or instead are based on more controlled,
analytic assessments. Evidence consistent with these possi-
bilities has emerged in many domains of social cognition,
including the study of stereotyping. For example, several
studies suggest that happiness is associated with a tendency to
think less extensively about the social environment. Instead,
happy people often appear content to rely on their generic
knowledge about social groups rather than taking the trouble
to engage in extensive individuation of particular group mem-
bers (e.g., Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Park &
Banaji, 2000; for a review, see Bodenhausen, Mussweiler,
Gabriel, & Moreno, 2001). Happiness may confer a sense of
confidence in initial top-down impressions that makes effort-
ful thought processes seem subjectively unnecessary. Fluctu-
ations in arousal can also influence information-processes
resources and thereby moderate the extent of reliance upon
stereotypical generalizations. For example, Bodenhausen
(1990) showed that stereotype-based discrimination covaried