410 Social Influence and Group Dynamics
in terms of its details can also induce low-level identification,
as can presenting the target with a surplus of concrete infor-
mation regarding the attitude object. From this disassembled
state, the target experiences a heightened press for integra-
tion. Left to his or her own devices, the target might emerge
with a higher-level frame for the action or topic that reflects
past positions or perhaps one that reflects a new integration
altogether (Vallacher & Nowak, 1997; Vallacher et al., 1998).
If, however, the influence agent offers a message that pro-
vides the missing integration before the target has demon-
strated emergence on his or her own, the target is likely to
embrace this message as an avenue of emergent understand-
ing, even if it conflicts with his or her prior conception.
This general approach to influence is effective in changing
people’s understanding of their own behavior, but with few
exceptions (e.g., Davis & Knowles, 1999; Vallacher & Selz,
1991) this approach has not been extended to other domains
of influence. Nonetheless, a wide variety of established influ-
ence strategies can be reframed as the disassembly of a
coherent state into its lower-level elements, setting the stage
for a reconfiguration of the elements in line with the influence
agent’s agenda. Thus, any strategy that involves inducing the
target to engage in acts that are at least somewhat novel or
time-consuming can create the necessary precondition for
guided emergence, as can providing the target with ambigu-
ous or conflicting information that is open to different higher-
level interpretations. Placing the target in a situation that lacks
a priori structure and coherence can similarly make him or her
vulnerable to emergent norms for how to act. Certain dimen-
sions of individual difference are also associated with vulner-
ability to social influence, and these too can be considered in
light of the emergence scenario. Self-uncertainty (e.g., Swann
& Ely, 1984; Vallacher, 1980), low levels of personal agency
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), field dependence (Witkin, Dyk,
Faterson, Goodenough, & Karp, 1962), low cognitive differ-
entiation (Bieri, Atkins, Briar, Leaman, Miller, & Tripodi,
1966), and external locus of control (Rotter, 1966) are clearly
distinct constructs, but each can be seen as a manifestation of
weak cognitive structure concerning a relevant domain of
judgment and self regulation (i.e., the self, action, other peo-
ple, society). Lacking internal coherence, a person character-
ized in this fashion utilizes information provided by others as
a frame around which he or she can achieve a sense of per-
sonal integration.
The failure of influence strategies, meanwhile, may reflect
a corresponding failure to disrupt or otherwise disassemble
the target’s prevailing understanding of the action or topic at
issue. Thus, resistance to influence (e.g., psychological reac-
tance) may be enhanced when the target’s prevailing per-
spective is not sufficiently deconstructed for him or her to
embrace the influence agent’s alternative perspective. In
essence, the emergence scenario suggests that all manner of
influence, from compliance with requests to brainwashing,
are built on a shared platform emphasizing people’s inherent
press for coherent understanding.
We should note, however, that complete integration is
rarely attained in complex systems. The cellular automata
model of social influence, for example, commonly produces
a highly clustered rather than unified social structure, even
though the underlying dynamics are in service of self-
organization and coherence (e.g., Nowak et al., 1990, 1998;
Nowak & Vallacher, 1998b). Differentiation as opposed to
unification is commonly observed as well in people’s self-
structure (Nowak et al., 2000), despite a sustained press for
integration in self-understanding. It is unreasonable, then, to
expect the voluminous literature on social influence to admit
to a single higher-order principle. Nor should we expect the
field to reach a static equilibrium, with an immutable set of
conclusions concerning the ways in which people influence
one another. Complex systems are inherently dynamic, con-
tinually evolving and becoming reconfigured in response to
new influences from the outside. Because interest in social
influence shows no sign of letting up, we can expect this
defining area of social psychology to display repeated
episodes of disassembly and reconfiguration in the years
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