Conflict and Coffee in Burundi 107
The monetary value of the few positions in the bureaucracy which are
available may certainly contribute to motivating "individuals ... to fight in
order to control the state and hence the sources of rent it gives access to".@
Especially since it is not the civil servants and politicians fighting but the
army, and since it is the rural Tutsi as well as the rural Hutu civilians who
bear the brunt of the death and destruction.
The my plays a central role in protecting and perpetuating the econom-
ic and political status quo of the predatory state, reflected in investments in
the military by the government. Military salaries made up 8% of total expen-
diture and net lending in 1992, which rose to 10% after the start of the cur-
rent conflict, and were raised to 15% after Buyoya took power in 1996.
Military spending on goods and services likewise rose in 1996 from between
7 and 9% of total expenditure and net lending from 1992-1996 to 13-15%
from 1997-1999, which is the most recent data. Highranking members of the
military also share in other economic opportunities and have immense pow-
ers of pa~onage.~'
The Fifth Five-Year Plan privileged Bujumbura and the surrounding area
as well as Bururi by allocating 98% of all gross fiied capital formation to
these areas. Especially fixed capital projects and infrastructure are a rich
source of revenues from conuption. As mentioned above, this shows both the
tendencies to go for rent-creating capital-intensive investment, as well as the
regional focus of this investment. Manufacturing, mainly of beer, is also
based almost exclusively in Bujumbura.
There is a seemingly perverse relationship between regional poverty and
control over the state. The southern provinces, which are privileged, are also
among the poorest. Soils are poor and the weather colder than in the rest of
the country, and so agricultural production is limited. According to Ngaruko
and Nkumnziza this means that purchasing power in the southern regions
relies heavily on the resources and remittances which flow back from
migrants to other regions." Furthermore, since the local economy provides
such limited options, young and entrepreneurial southerners invest their
energies and resources into rent-seeking activities, such as gaining access to
the state, financial institutions, import and export firms and the construction
sector. This perspective adds an element to the argument that control over
the state as a source of accumulation, the army as a means to enforce and
protect this control, and the education sector as a means of accessing it, are
crucial for the southern elite, since they see no alternative economic options
in their local environment.
The fact that the south remains structurally poor and dependent on remit-
tances from the 'productive' parts of the country would seem to support the
conclusion of high levels of corruption in the system. If a region which has
been systematically privileged above all others in terms of infrastructure has
not been able to build a sustainable local economic base, this infrastructure