tests, that are only weakly related to measures of personality traits, implying
that intelligence and personality represent two largely separate spheres of in-
quiry (see Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Zeidner & Matthews, 2000).
We adopt a broad view of intellectual functioning. Social problem solving
requires more than just the abstract processes of analysis and reasoning that
are at the core of conventional intelligence. Studies of practical intelligence
(e.g., Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2000) emphasize that much real-world exper-
tise is supported by acquired skills tailored to a particular problem or con-
text. We argue that individual differences in such expertise are shaped by ba-
sic biological and cognitive processes, as well as situational exposure. In
addition, reasoning processes are biased by other, parallel cognitive processes
such as selective attention and retrieval from memory, and by emotional and
motivational influences. For example, in real life, decision making may be bi-
ased due to selective processing of data, excessive emotional commitment to a
course of action, and impulsive action motivated by external pressures
(Mann, 1992). Thus, our approach is to see intellectual functioning as one as-
pect of a wider self-regulative process that is not captured well by standard
ability tests.
It is a considerable challenge to relate the multiplicity of processes sup-
porting self-regulation to personality factors. The traditional trilogy of mind
represents domains of cognition, emotion, and motivation (or conation) as
distinct, though interacting, mental systems (Hilgard, 1980). Mayer, Frasier
Chabot, and Carlsmith (1997) set out the case for treating the domains as
three separate systems, each with its own function, developmental onset, tem-
poral characteristics, and brain localizations (consciousness may reflect a fur-
ther domain). At the same time, there is considerable conceptual and empiri-
cal overlap between the different systems. Theories of basic emotions link
each emotion to characteristic cognitions and action tendencies (Lazarus,
1993). Anger, for example, relates to attributions of hostility to others, and
motivations to strike out at others. Personality traits are increasingly defined
in terms of the trilogy. Extraversion and neuroticism have been related to
positive and negative affect, conscientiousness to achievement striving, agree-
ableness to social beliefs and motivations, and openness to intellectual inter-
ests. An exceedingly rich empirical literature shows that traits predict many
criteria relating to emotion, cognition and motivation (Matthews, Deary, &
Whiteman, in press).
The picture is similar for transient states. The state construct is best known
from studies of affect, that is, basic moods and more differentiated emotions.
However, it is difficult to disentangle affective from cognitive and motiva-
tional states. Stress may be experienced not just as affects such as tension and
unhappiness, but also through disturbances in cognition (e.g., worry) and
loss of motivation, as in the burnout syndrome (Matthews et al., 2002). Thus,
transient impairments of intellectual functioning induced by stressors such as
144 MATTHEWS AND ZEIDNER