of accommodation, individuals may become excessively dependent on others
to define aspects of reality for the self.
Even though Piaget addressed such limits to genuine integration, yet his the-
ory has not fully explored the depth of affect and its possible role not only in
facilitating such integration, but also in impeding it (Labouvie-Vief, 1994). Per-
haps most significant is the fact that cognitive-developmental models tend to
adopt a notion of integration that is primarily oriented by criteria of cognitive
or formal fit. That integration in development is not primarily a cognitive
achievement is a tenet basic to more psychodynamic approaches to develop-
ment. These approaches emphasize that integration arises out of strengths of
the self—a sense of basic self-worth and goodness of self, a core faith in the be-
nevolence of others and reality in general—that are more directly emotional in
nature—in particular emotions that arise out of the interpersonal world.
Erikson (e.g., 1984) has referred to those mechanisms as ones that encourage a
sense of basic trust and the resilience in emotion-regulation and self-regulation
that emerges from this dimension, and modern attachment theory (e.g., Bowl-
by, 1978, 1989) has elaborated those mechanisms as they evolve out of the early
relationship between parents and children. The basic sense of trust that hope-
fully emerges out of this core relationship in turn supports a positive self core
that is able to integrate experience and afford resilience.
Considerations such as those previously mentioned suggest that the ability
to integrate hinges not only on emerging cognitive capacities in a narrower
and formal sense. Rather, cognitive capacities and accomplishments are em-
bedded in an interpersonal and intersubjective frame that gives those skills
validation and meaning (Labouvie-Vief, 1994). Does the self find a social en-
vironment that mirrors, affirms, and enhances emerging cognitive construc-
tions, or one that opposes and undermines them? In the former case, integra-
tion of feeling and thinking will be enhanced but in the latter, individuals will
need to search for defensive solutions that reflect a compromise between feel-
ing and thinking. Thus, even though cognitive theories often describe cogni-
tion as a relatively isolated act in which the self interacts with inanimate ob-
jects, a more complete description of cognitive-affective development also
needs to include how objects are related to an interpersonal and subjective
world in which they acquire definition and meaning (see also Werner &
Kaplan, 1962).
A related limitation of cognitive-developmental approaches rests in their
assumption of what drives the tendency toward disequilibration, differentia-
tion, and amplification. Piaget (1981), for example, assumed that the primary
motives are purely information-related ones, such as surprise and interest
that result from the realization that accustomed-to knowledge no longer
works. In some sense, to be sure, this assumption is a unique strength, since it
points to mechanisms of development that reside in positive motives toward
openness, growth, and change. However, much literature suggests that differ-
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