wide range of intellectual activities, from the development of new scientific
theories (e.g., Darwin’s evolutionary theory; see Gruber, 1981) to conceptual
change in classroom (Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003).
Summary
We have described three types of approach to integration: neurobiological,
psychological-behavioral, and phenomenological. They attempt to explain
the same intellectual phenomena but at different levels of description. As we
shall see in the following sections, individual differences, developmental, and
contextual approaches all resort to these three levels of description and expla-
nation (for alternative frameworks, see Newell, 1990, and Pylyshyn, 1984).
We also argue that an ultimate understanding of intellectual functioning and
development depends on integration of all the three levels of analysis.
INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY: FROM
PSYCHOMETRICS TO PERSONAL DYNAMICS
Differential perspectives on intellectual functioning has enjoyed a long his-
tory, reflecting a deep-rooted assumption in the West about individual differ-
ences in intellectual potential (e.g., Galton, 1883). It is worth noting that this
mode of thinking is population based; that is, it focuses on different levels of
individual functioning relative to population norms (e.g., within-species vari-
ations; see Lohman, 2001). Interestingly, the definitions of intelligence in the
formative years of intelligence theory were highly functional rather than
structural. For example, Binet (Binet & Simon, 1916) emphasized direction,
adapation, and criticism (an equivalent of reflection or metacognitive control
in today’s language), a distinct process view of intelligence that combines co-
native and cognitive dimensions. Spearman (1927) suspected that intelligence
has to do with mental energy, and thus is conative as well as cognitive (see
Messick, 1996 for a discussion). McDougall (1923) seemed to foresee some of
the problems of interpreting what is intelligence in later years: “Intelligence is
essentially the capacity for making new adaptations; it cannot be described in
terms of structure” (p. 379). Wechsler (1950) also insisted on the inclusion of
conation and other nonintellective factors in the definition of intelligence. It
is only when factor analytic technique perpetuated a more structural view of
intellectual competence that the construct of intelligence became hardened
and lost more juicy and dynamic aspects of its meaning.
With the rise of cognitive psychology, major theoretical and research ef-
forts have been attempted to explain psychometric intelligence in terms of un-
derlying cognitive processes (e.g., the componential subtheory of the triarchic
theory of intelligence: Sternberg, 1985; see also Deary, 2001 for a most recent
- BEYOND COGNITIVISM 15