A recent writer on miracles begins his discussion of Hume's essay by saying, “What does
Hume mean by `popular religions'? I think he means simply any religion—any
theological world view—which is evidentially based chiefly or solely on the alleged
occurrence of miracles: such religions as the Christianity of most Christians who have
lived and (as I would say, though this is rather more controversial) the Judaism of most
Jews who have lived” (Johnson 1999, 1). This view strikes me as rather unrealistic.
Intellectual biographies are highly individualistic. Even people who share a large set of
beliefs about certain topics—about a theological worldview, about the Christian faith,
and so on—may arrange these beliefs in quite different orders with respect to the way
some are taken to be evidence for others. The Gospels certainly represent some people as
coming to believe in Jesus because of the miracles that they saw. For those people, the
view expressed in the quotation above may well represent their intellectual biography.
They saw the miracles, and took the miracles to be evidence, and on the basis of that
evidence they came to believe something special about Jesus.
There are other people, however, who believe in Jesus and also believe that Jesus did
miracles, but who do not believe in Jesus because they believe in the miracles. Their
belief in the miracles does not occupy a privileged position in their intellectual life. It is
not prior to their other religious beliefs—temporally, logically, or in any other way. They
accept the miracles, some of them anyway, because they are prominent elements in the
accounts of Jesus' life, and they seem to make sense in that context. And that acceptance
is part of their acceptance of the whole Christian view of the context of human life, of
human history, of human destiny, and so on. They may or may not have some “rationale”
for accepting that whole ball of wax, but if they do, then it does not focus in any special
way on miracles. It seems to me that many contemporary Christians fall into this
category. It seems to me that I do myself.
Could there be a miracle that had a point other than, or in addition to, an epistemic point?
Yes, or so it surely seems to me. After all, most of the miracles attributed to Jesus had
some effect in addition to whatever epistemic significance
end p.311
they may have had. Someone was healed, wedding guests got some good wine to drink,
and so on. And most of us can readily agree that many of the additional effects attributed
to these miracles are good things. It would seem that these good effects might well be at
least part of the intention associated with the miraculous acts. They might be, partly or
wholly, the purpose for which the miraculous act was done.
Could there be a miracle that was a foundation of a religion in virtue of some
nonepistemic purpose or point, rather than in virtue of its epistemic point? It would seem
so. The Apostle Paul writes, “If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are
still in your sins” (I Corinthians 15:17). This appears to claim that the resurrection of
Jesus is an essential part of the divine project of redeeming the world from sin. It
suggests that if Jesus were not in fact raised from the dead, then that whole project would
be a dismal failure: we would still be in our sins. Thus, the resurrection of Jesus is
construed here as being essential, foundational, to the project with which the Christian
religion is concerned. This is the second way a miracle might be the foundation of a