generalizations are, of course, always (or almost always) false. Not all taxpayers do in
fact file returns on or before the fifteenth of April. This fact, which falsifies the universal
generalization, signifies the violation of the law. But the law is not invalidated by the
violation (at least, if there are not too many violations). And so both the law and the
violation belong to the reality of the social order. This structural similarity may in fact be
what lies behind the convergence of terminology at this point.^5
The Point of Miracles
What might be the point of a miracle? This question arises in connection with Hume's
curiously modest statement about the conclusion of his line of argument. Near the end of
his essay he says, “We may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have
such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of
religion.” He then immediately goes on to say, “I beg the limitations here made may be
remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a
system of religion” (1777, 127).
Hume construes his own conclusion as limited in two respects. First, he says explicitly
that his argument is limited to a conclusion about the insufficiency of human testimony
with regard to miracles. It is therefore not about the possibility or the actuality of
miracles. Second, this insufficiency bears only on whether the miracle is to be made “the
just foundation” for a religion.
Perhaps Hume thought that the only way a miracle might be significant for a religion
would be that of providing a just foundation for that religion. But there are at least two
importantly different senses in which a miracle might be a foundation of a religion. First,
there is a broadly epistemic sense, which turns our attention to the way a miracle might
have a bearing on belief—inducing a belief perhaps, or providing some justification for
it. The miracle might attract attention to the religion, and it might get someone to accept
that religion by providing some evidence, or at least what might seem to be evidence, in
support of that religion. Somewhat more strongly, the miracle might supply sufficient
evidence to justify a person in accepting the religion. (This stronger sense might
correspond to Hume's use of the word “just” in stating his conclusion.) I will say that a
miracle that performs this sort of belief-related function, in either the stronger or the
weaker way, is an “epistemic foundation” for the corresponding religion.^6 It seems clear,
and perhaps uncontroversial, that miracles may well have an epistemic effect and thus
may constitute epistemic foundations, at least in the weak sense. At least, they may often
have such an effect if they are rather striking. The Gospels repeatedly report that the
strange things that Jesus did resulted in large numbers of people believing in him. After
describing the resurrection of Lazarus, for example, the Gospel of John adds, “Many of
the Jews therefore, who had come with Mary and had seen what Jesus did, believed in
him” (11:45). And this is an oft-repeated theme throughout the Gospels. It should be
added, however, that miracles are not universally effective in this way, at least in the case
of Jesus. A little later, the Gospel of John observes that, “although he had performed so
many signs in their presence, they did not believe in him” (12:37). And that theme is also
echoed elsewhere in the Gospels.