occasion reject Thomistic views in a way that more traditional Thomists were unwilling
to do. By doing this they are in effect mining Aquinas, and other medieval philosophers,
for ideas that can challenge and enrich contemporary philosophical theology.
Like other successful philosophical enterprises, analytic philosophy of religion has been
subjected to criticisms, only a few of which can be addressed here. One criticism is that it
tends to be ahistorical, and no doubt this has sometimes been true. But it is much less the
case now than previously, as analytic philosophers of religion engage seriously with a
wide range of historical exemplars in both philosophy and theology. Another criticism is
directed at the emphasis on formalized arguments, which is said to mimic mathematics
and natural science and to concede to the latter an undeserved, and harmful, position of
hegemony. Clearly, formalization can be overdone and can lead to obfuscation rather
than clarity. Nevertheless, there is an old tradition in philosophy (long antedating the rise
of modern natural science) that recognizes the need for technical precision, and just plain
hard philosophical work, in trying to get clear about fundamental issues. (Think of
Aristotle, or the later dialogues of Plato.) There is also a long tradition of at least partly
successful attempts to integrate the philosophical/scientific study of nature into a fuller
conception of “the way things are.” It is rather the postmodernists, with their denigration
of science and their scorn for comprehensive worldviews, who are the innovators.
Whether good can come from these innovations remains to be seen.
Perhaps the most interesting criticism of analytic philosophy of religion is that it is guilty
of an inordinate preoccupation with theism. This criticism is complex and can be
interpreted in a number of different ways. If it is meant as a reminder that other,
nontheistic religious traditions are worthy of philosophical exploration, then the point is
well taken—and work on those other traditions is beginning to be done, though not as yet
fully developed. Another relevant observation is that theism as discussed by philosophers
is but a pale, skeletal abstraction,
end p.442
far removed from the rich complex of beliefs and practices of a living religion. This also
is correct, but it is less than a devastating criticism. The truth of theism is far from
sufficient, but is certainly a necessary condition for the general truthfulness of either
Christianity, or Judaism, or Islam, or theistic forms of Hinduism. Furthermore, the field
has broadened to address particular religious doctrines and a much wider range of
concerns than previously; it is by no means limited to “mere theism.”
Other versions of the criticism are harder to classify. When we are told that by the word
“God” “something of unutterable significance is intended, but for that very reason any
literal and unmediated reference to God is conceptually vacuous” (Crites 1996, 44), what
are we to make of this? If arguments were offered for this conclusion they could be
discussed. But what we are actually given is often no more than a few hand-waving
references to Kant, made without any recognition of the rebuttals to Kantianism in recent
analytic philosophy. Some of this postmodern critique gives every impression of being
about a quarter-century out of date.
The merits of analytic philosophy of religion can be rather simply stated. This approach
to philosophizing offers the best means yet available for clarifying the meaning of
religious claims and for assessing the reasons for and against the truth of those claims.