MULLAHS AND MISSILES 175infantry. That particular technology is complex and requires mathematical
skills not readily available in an illiterate population, but even the process
of firing a few spotting rounds before the main barrage, then walking the
shells onto the desired target before executing the main barrage, had not
been attempted. This is a clear indication that the most important aspects
of the operation of artillery had yet to be mastered.
Many Muslim military operations lacked strong cadres, but this lack
was most markedly demonstrated in early April when the Syrian forces,
under Abd el Kader el-Husseini, attacked Kastel. The Syrian forces were
using their superior numbers to gain ground when a chance bullet killed
their leader. His death demoralized the entire Syrian force and their attack
collapsed. Any depth of leadership would have allowed the attack to con-
tinue despite the death of their commander.
The quality of training was also apparent from the Jews’ frequent suc-
cess in turning the flanks of attacking Muslim forces. Once the Muslim
forces found Jews on their flanks or in their rear, their attacks invariably
collapsed and frequently turned into routs, abandoning much valuable
equipment to the Jews, who desperately needed any heavy weapons they
could capture. The fundamental tactic of posting forces at key points and
on the flanks of an advance to ensure the security of the advance was
unknown to the inadequately trained Muslim commanders.
In addition, the various Arab forces did not cooperate. When the Jewish
forces counterattacked the Egyptians and were driving them south, the
hapless Egyptian commander called to his “allies” for support. As Lieu-
tenant General Glubb began to move the Arab Legion in to support the
Egyptians, King Abdullah directly ordered him not to support his erst-
while allies. What was not lost by technical military incompetence was
thrown away by internecine strife within the Muslim ranks.
Chaim Herzog, later prime minister of Israel, summed up the problem
of the Muslim armies with the following observation:^1
On the opposing side, the Arab Legion stood out as the outstanding army,
British-officered and led as it was; but even after the British left some years
later, it continued to be the most effective Arab army, well led, brave and
satisfactorily organized. All the Arab armies apart from Kaukji’s Arab Lib-
eration Army proved to be highly effective in the defense, and this was to
characterize them over the coming years. But their failing in attack arose
out of the fact that, when their set-piece attack encountered unexpected
obstacles, the junior leadership in the field was incapable of adapting itself
rapidly enough to the changing circumstances of the battle. Above all, the
inter-Arab bickering—which over the years was to erupt sporadically in
internecine strife—plagued the Arab forces. While they all fought against