180 ISLAM AT WAR
of the Israeli turning movements caused the senior Egyptian unit com-
manders to fear for their lives, and they repeatedly abandoned their troops,
fleeing to the western bank of the Suez. Abandoned by their officers, the
lower ranks panicked and refused to face the Israelis.
The panic in the Egyptian ranks and the absence of their officers was
omnipresent. At one point an Israeli force pushing toward Nakhle found
the Egyptian 125th Armored Brigade, 6th Mechanized Division, aban-
doned with all its equipment in perfect condition and in place. The Egyp-
tian troops had simply fled on foot.
Like the Egyptians, the Syrians had heavily fortified the Golan Heights
and for a time fought hard to defend them. However, once the Israelis had
broken through their defenses, the Syrians showed themselves unable to
deal with a fluid military situation and so broke and fled. Only the threat
of Russian intervention prevented the Israelis from taking Damascus.
In contrast to the Egyptians and Syrians, who were supplied, equipped,
and trained by the Russians, the Jordanian army was equipped with Amer-
ican and British weapons. It was still generally regarded as the best and
most professional of the Arab armies and would prove itself so when the
Israelis encountered it in the June 5–7 battle for Nablus.
Israeli infantry and a supporting mechanized brigade had fought
through the night of June 5 to penetrate the antitank defenses around Jenin.
The next day a Jordanian counterstroke almost overwhelmed the Israelis
with a powerful counterattack, though the static portions of the attack were
more effective than the mobile ones. Had the mobile portion been better
handled, the Jordanian Patton tanks would have had little trouble destroy-
ing the obsolete Israeli Sherman tanks. Nonetheless, the Israelis consider
this attack to have been the most effective attack launched by any of the
Arab armies during the war. It is not hard to see that the heritage of the
Arab Legion and General Glubb remained in place. Other Jordanian forces
could also fight effectively.
In another fine example of a hard fight, the 40th Jordanian Armored
Brigade advanced to the Qabatiya road junction just south of Jenin and
attacked the Israeli “M” brigade’s rear guard. In a deliberate shoot-move
attack, the Jordanian Patton tanks shot up the scattered Israeli mechanized
forces that had been left behind at that road junction as the “M” Brigade
had moved to attack Jenin. The Jordanian attack in the Israeli rear occurred
while the bulk of the Israeli brigade’s forces were engaged near Jenin.
Learning of the attack in their rear, the Israelis began to redeploy their
armor to face this new attack. The Jordanians defending Jenin increased
a coordinated effort to tie the Israelis in place. Israeli divisional artillery
turned on the Qabatiya road junction and slowed the Jordanian assault but