A Study in American Jewish Leadership

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and trades were mobilized, and so were university students; Talmud Torahs
were canvassed, and banks on New York’s Lower East Side were authorized
to accept donations. Although no direct appeal was made to Christians, the
press was alerted, and some churches and clergymen added their contribu-
tions.^42 The NCRSRM’s sole competitor was the Jewish Self-Defense As-
sociation, which aimed to provide arms for Russian Jews. A movement that
symbolized Jewish independence and self-reliance, it had a distinct antiste-
ward ring. Bemoaning the passivity of his fellow Jews, one Zionist criti-
cized dependence on the steward “who cringingly sought the favor of the


... mighty ones, generally mingling his voice of wailing with the ringing
sound of precious metal.” Schiff himself contributed to the defense fund;
but doubtless worried by reports that the fund was used for revolutionary
purposes instead of defense, he stayed aloof from managing the fund.^43
The popular response to the NCRSRM was almost deafening. In addi-
tion to contributions, all sorts of letters were received, from those inquir-
ing about the fate of relatives in Russia to those from entertainers offering
their talents on behalf of the cause. Within less than a month the
NCRSRM raised close to $1 million from 690 localities and 399 lodges
and societies. New York City’s share came to almost one-half of the total,
but responses from far-flung cities and towns—often less than $5 and
sometimes accompanied by a note in Yiddish, Hebrew, or ungrammatical
English—testified to the committee’s extensive and efficient labors. Each
donation was recorded and acknowledged by Schiff’s office. The banker
personally thanked Christian leaders and prominent public figures (like J.
P. Morgan) at the same time that he advanced sums to Europe before their
actual receipt.
Overall, Schiff’s supervision guaranteed a strictly businesslike cam-
paign. The unprecedented success of the relief drive, successful enough to
permit withholding a portion in reserve for future emergencies, proved
that American Jewish unity was soonest attained in response to the needs of
fellow Jews abroad. Ironically, a successful relief drive of this kind could be
self-defeating. Some stewards noted bitterly that they were creating a “Po-
grom Endowment Fund,”^44 assuring Russia that Jewish money would enter
the country whenever pogroms occurred.
Schiff’s role encompassed more than that of treasurer. For all intents
and purposes he was the linchpin or cohesive element that bonded the
American and European Jewish leaders. Since he was the powerful banker
who enjoyed access to President Roosevelt as well as to Witte, it was natu-
ral for the Europeans to turn to him first. With Rothschild and Montagu of
London, Nathan of Berlin, and Baron Horace Guenzberg in Russia, who
was authorized by his government to supervise the distribution of funds,
Schiff was pivotal in the planning and execution of strategy. The joint la-
bors of this handful of men dealt with all facets of the relief problem: they


Captivity and Redemption 141
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