dicted, Russia’s fate would be sealed. Although not fully convinced of the
prime minister’s goodwill, he refused to stage an endrun around Witte by
purchasing the help of the high Russian nobility. Until the end of 1905 he
continued to hope that liberal reform would crush the reactionary forces.^47
Reaction and recurring pogroms continued to sweep Russia in 1906. No
help for the Jews came from the Duma, and Witte was removed from
power in April. Verbal prodding from TR helped to avert pogroms during
Easter, but in June the Jews of Bialystok were again badly hit. Schiff called
Bialystok the last gasp of a dying regime, but he too lost his usual opti-
mism. Tried stratagems—pressure on the administration, attempts to in-
fluence public opinion through the press and periodicals, efforts to block
Russian loans—had little telling effect. He turned yet again to the presi-
dent, but Roosevelt refused to rebuke Russia publicly. Undeterred by the
TR’s mounting impatience, Schiff enlisted his son, the president’s neighbor
in Oyster Bay, to relay his messages and the grim cables from Europe. I
know you can’t help, he admitted to TR, and only the horror of the situa-
tion prompted his requests. To feel powerless was “maddening.” Grasping
at straws, he mentioned a report that the French might send ships to evac-
uate the victims. If they did, it would be “the greatest act of humanity” by
any government. On another occasion he suggested that Roosevelt write
directly to the czar. Nevertheless, his appeals to Roosevelt’s humanitarian-
ism failed.^48
The appointment of Oscar Straus to the cabinet (1906), which Schiff,
like TR, held up as a lesson to Russia on how Jews should be treated, made
no impression on the czarist regime. In those trying days other approaches
were equally unsuccessful. Despite Jewish counterefforts, Russia succeeded
in floating a loan through French banks and the Baring house in London.
And since the Associated Press, under the biased management of Melville
Stone, kept up the distribution of pro-Russia reports to the press, appeals
for enlightened public opinion became empty rhetoric.^49
Schiff confessed to a friend that his mind was occupied day and night
with the Russian situation. Loath to admit utter helplessness, he tried to
mobilize non-Jewish allies; he met with the representative of the Russian
Peasant Party, and he supported Jan Pouren, whose extradition was de-
manded by Russia. Out of desperation and out of character, he also can-
vassed associates for ideas on what to attempt next. Although he felt that he
should scale down his activities when he turned sixty, he refused to admit
defeat in his war against the czar.^50
Sir Ernest Cassel, now the close associate of Edward VII, offered a new
approach. He told Schiff that “Nature has not endowed me with the capac-
ity which has enabled you to become one of the foremost leaders to fight
against an enormous power,” but he was prompted by Schiff’s work during
1905–6 to try his hand at the improvement of the Russo-Jewish situation.
Captivity and Redemption 143