42 The Economist February 12th 2022
Europe
GermanyOlaf Scholz wakes up
T
hey werenot the sort of headlines any
leader would hope to read. “Germany,
nato’s weakest link,” said the Wall Street
Journal. “The ‘invisible’ chancellor heads to
Washington amid fierce criticism,” offered
the New York Times. As Russian troops
massed on Ukraine’s border and the West
fumbled for a response, Olaf Scholz, Ger
many’s new chancellor, stood accused by
allies of being missing in action. At home
Germans concerned by his reluctance to
enter domestic debates detected a pattern.
“Our image has been seriously damaged
abroad,” says Johann Wadephul, an mp
from the opposition Christian Democrats.
With criticism mounting, Mr Scholz
has belatedly sprung into action. On Febru
ary 7th he visited Joe Biden in Washington,
dc. He hosted half a dozen euleaders in
Berlin this week, and on February 14th and
15th will travel to Kyiv and then Moscow for
his first meeting with Vladimir Putin. Offi
cials do not expect this sudden burst of di
plomacy to bring immediate results. But it
shows a sensitivity to allies’ demands for
German action. The damage control was most urgent in
America. Here concerns have centred on
Germany’s reluctance to threaten to scrap
Nord Stream 2, a new undersea RussiaGer
many gas pipeline that America fears
would allow the Kremlin to blackmail Eu
rope. Mr Biden says he will kill the pipeline
if Russia invades. German officials concur.
But like an actor nervous of uttering
“Macbeth” in a theatre, Mr Scholz refuses
to let the words “Nord Stream 2” pass his
lips in public. This increasingly farcical
stance, designed to forestall Russian alle
gations that Germany is wielding energy as
a weapon, wins the chancellor few friends.
Nor does Germany’s stubborn denial of
Ukraine’s requests for weapons.
Yet on substance Germany and America
are broadly aligned. The two countries
have been discussing potential sanctions
since last September and financial officials
from the two countries now speak at least
weekly. Should Russia invade, Germany
would be willing to sign up to a common
package. What transatlantic (and intraeu)
differences there are revolve around details, especially on the Russian gas that ac
counts for over half of Germany’s imports.
Mr Biden, for his part, is keen to calm the
storm. “Germany is completely, totally,
thoroughly reliable,” he said during Mr
Scholz’s visit. A group of senators who
dined with the chancellor declared them
selves charmed. During a tvinterview Mr
Scholz defended Western values with an
ardour that surprised even his supporters.
Germany is stepping up in Europe, too.
The government will not change its mind
on arms exports, but it has sent more
troops to Lithuania, where Germany has
led a nato force since 2017. Emmanuel
Macron has taken the diplomatic lead for
Europe, but is coordinating with Mr
Scholz. The chancellor’s team hope his vis
it to Moscow will pick up where the French
president this week left off (see Interna
tional section). The two leaders are united
in trying to breathe life into the Normandy
format, a diplomatic grouping that brings
France and Germany together with Russia
and Ukraine, thereby offering Europeans a
seat at the negotiating table.
These ambitions are married with frus
tration over the criticism laid at Germany’s
door. “Maybe our allies have to come to
terms with the ‘Scholz way’,” says Nils
Schmid, the foreignpolicy spokesman for
the parliamentary group of Mr Scholz’s So
cial Democrats (spd). He defines this as
“short, clear statements and a refusal to be
pressured into saying particular things”.
During last year’s election campaign MrB ERLIN
A beleaguered chancellor launches a diplomatic offensive→Alsointhissection
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