50 The Economist February 12th 2022
International
GeopoliticsHow Russia revived NATO
V
ladimir putin’sgiant oval table in the
Kremlin is as extreme as it is kitsch.
Sitting far from foreign visitors may be his
way of social distancing. But it also be
tokens the gulf that separated Russia’s
leader from his guest, Emmanuel Macron
of France. It may also illustrate what dip
lomats say is Mr Putin’s worrying isolation
from the world. None can claim to read his
mind as he masses some 130,000 troops on
the borders around Ukraine. Is he about to
launch the biggest war in Europe since the
fall of the Berlin Wall? Or is it all a big bluff?
On February 7th Mr Macron was the first
heavyweight Western leader this year to
visit Moscow to divine Mr Putin’s inten
tions. Before arriving the French president
said he did not believe in “spontaneous
miracles”. After five hours of talks, there
was no clear outcome. Visiting Kyiv the
next day, Mr Macron said Mr Putin had
pledged that Russia “would not be the
cause of an escalation” on the border. The
Kremlin denied this, and brushed off the
notion that Mr Macron could negotiate
anything. “France is a nato member, butParis is not the leader there. A very differ
ent country runs this bloc,” said Dmitry
Peskov, Mr Putin’s spokesman. “So what
deals can we talk about?” In sum, the only
interlocutor that matters is America.
Mr Putin, for his part, launched into yet
another blistering attack on nato. And Uk
raine, he said, must abide by the socalled
Minsk protocols of 201415—or, rather,
Russia’s interpretation of them. “Whether
you like it or don’t like it, bear with it, my
beauty,” the Russian leader said crudely,
perhaps quoting the lyrics of an obscene
song about rape and necrophilia. Mr Mac
ron has long wanted warmer relations with
Mr Putin. The danger, if his highstakes di
plomacy goes wrong, is that he will be seen
as a dupe or, worse, as an accessory to Rus
sia’s violation of Ukraine.
Yet there is little alternative to talking
to Mr Putin. Russia has assembled the
densest concentration of military firepow
er that Europe has seen in decades. Uk
raine is surrounded on three sides. Rus
sian amphibious assaultships are gather
ing in the Black Sea. On February 5th America said Russia had deployed 70% of the
force it would need to invade Ukraine: an
attack could start “any day”. nato worries
that large military exercises in Belarus,
starting this week, may provide cover for
an assault, perhaps alongside a nuclear ex
ercise. Nuclearcapable Russian bombers
have flown patrols close to Poland.
nato will not fight for Ukraine. Instead
America and Europe have mustered a
threepronged response: deterrence, by
arming Ukraine and threatening unprece
dented economic sanctions if Russia at
tacks; reassurance of allies by deploying
extra forces to central and eastern Europe;
and diplomacy to stay Mr Putin’s hand.
Olaf Scholz, Germany’s new chancellor,
will visit Kyiv and Moscow next week on
the heels of Mr Macron (see Europe sec
tion). There has already been a meeting of
the “Weimar triangle” (the leaders of
France, Germany and Poland). The “Nor
mandy” format (officials from France, Ger
many, Russia and Ukraine) was set to con
fer on February 10th. If successful, this may
be followed by a Normandy summit. As
long as Russia keeps talking, the Euro
peans all hope, it will not start shooting.
Mr Macron has greater ambitions. With
the departure of Angela Merkel, Germany’s
veteran chancellor, he can claim to be Eu
rope’s senior statesman. Beyond averting
war, he wants to settle the status of Uk
raine, shove Europe back onto the dip
lomatic stage and ultimately establish
greater “European sovereignty” and a newB ERLIN, BRUSSELS, KYIV, MOSCOW AND PARIS
But might Ukraine pay the price of European diplomacy?