The Economist February 12th 2022 International 51
security order on the continent.
On the military standoff, Mr Macron
warned of the risk of “incandescence”. But
French and German diplomats have been
warier of declaring that Russia’s buildup
signalled an “imminent” invasion, as
America and Britain have tended to argue.
European officials now espy a narrow
pathto avoid conflict. It passes through the
Normandy format, the one forum where
Russia and Ukraine can negotiate directly.
For all of Mr Putin’s demands about halting
nato’s eastbound expansion and even roll
ing back its current military deployments,
what most seems to vex him is Ukraine.
The country has shifted towards the West
ern camp since 2014, when a revolt ousted
its autocratic Moscowbacked president,
Viktor Yanukovych. This prompted Mr Pu
tin to annex Crimea and foment a separat
ist revolt in the eastern Donbas region.
At the barrel of a gun Petro Poroshenko,
Ukraine’s next elected president, accepted
the Minsk accords. These were deliberately
vague. On the security side they mandated
a ceasefire, a withdrawal of heavy weapons
from the front lines, an exchange of pris
oners and the removal of “foreign troops”,
meaning Russians. On the political side
Ukraine agreed to make constitutional
changes to decentralise power, hold local
elections and give Donbas a special status.
Ukraine would then be allowed to regain
control over its border.
How “special” that status would be was
left undefined, as was the precise sequence
of steps and the question of whether the
1.5m people of Donbas displaced by the
conflict should have a say in its future. In
effect, Ukrainian law would not apply
there. Donbas would have its own local mi
litias. In the eyes of Russia the purpose of
Minsk was to create a Trojan horse to give it
control of Ukraine.
Mr Poroshenko’s attempt in 2015 to
push a mild version of the constitutional
changes through the Rada (parliament)
prompted fierce protests from national
ists, resulting in the death of several na
tional guards. But defying expectations of
its collapse, Ukraine muddled through,
ducked and dodged, survived and consoli
dated. It stabilised its economy and built
up and modernised its army. As the first
line of its national anthem goes, “Ukraine
is not yet dead.” Though he could not im
plement the Minsk accords, Mr Poroshen
ko could not ditch them either. As the Uk
raine crisis flares again, European leaders
are urging his successor, Volodymyr Zelen
sky, to reengage with Minsk.
But implementing the accords has be
come a lot harder. Russia has tightened its
grip over the separatist territories. It has
built up a force estimated at 40,000 men,
eliminated some of the unrulier com
manders and installed its own leaders. It
has distributed hundreds of thousands of
passportstoresidentsofDonbas,manyof
whomvotedlastyearinRussia’sparlia
mentaryelections.
BringingDonbasbackintoUkraineon
Russia’stermscouldspelltheendofUk
raineasa sovereignstate,orsomanyUk
rainiansfear.Oneworryisthatconstitu
tionalchangeleading to“federalisation”
wouldgive Donbas—and thusRussia—a
vetoonUkraine’sWestleaningpolicy,no
tablyitsabilityto joinnato. Another is
thatitwillcorrodethecountryfromwith
in,bygivingRussiamorewaystomeddle
initsaffairs. AsZerkaloNedeli, anonline
Ukrainianweekly,pointsout,forcingUk
rainetoenactMinskis“aslowandpainful
execution—notbyshooting,butbyinject
ingitwithlethalpoison”. Withhisown
popularityratingdroppingbelow25%,an
energycrisisloomingandthecostofliving
rising,MrZelenskywouldfacemassprot
estsif Ukrainiansseeit asa sellout.
AvoidtheFinnishline
YetsomeveteranUkrainianpoliticians,in
cluding Arsen Avakov, aformer interior
minister,andMrPoroshenko,believethat
Ukraine is strongerthanitmay appear.
They think Mr Putin would struggle to
forceUkrainetosurrenderitssovereignty.
AfternearlyeightyearsofwarUkraine’sar
my,oneofthelargestinEurope,ishard
ened. This,alongwithfirmerbackingfrom
abroad,mayexplainwhyUkraine’seliteis
relativelycalm.“Mymessageis:don’ttrust
Putinanddon’tbeafraidofPutin,”saysMr
Poroshenko.“Strengthandresolveisthe
onlylanguagethatworks.”
Ukrainemaybeabletocopewitha ver
sionofMinskthatfallsshortofMrPutin’s
demands.Itcould,forexample,agreeto
negotiatewiththenewlyappointedheads
ofDonbas,providedthatRussiaremoved
itsproxyforces.Oritcouldagreetohold
elections and dress updecentralisation,
whichhasalreadytakenplaceintherestof
Ukraine,asthe“specialstatus”forDonbas,
aslong as Ukrainianlaws apply. Inthe
meantime Mr Putin may calculate that
waitingforMrZelenskytofalterandforthe
economiccrunchtotakeeffectmaybeless
dangerous than fighting. Russia would
needatleast700,000mentocaptureand
occupyUkraine,someanalystsreckon.
Apeculiarityofthecrisisisthat,even
thoughnooneinnatothinksUkraineisfit
tojointhealliancesoon,ifever,thebody
cannotbe seento close its“opendoor”
policyinthefaceofRussianthreats.Some
Europeandiplomatsthinkthecirclecould
besquaredifUkraineitselfweretodeclare
itsneutrality,asAustriaandFinlanddid
afterthesecondworldwar.Askedabout
“Finlandisation”,MrMacronletslipthatit
was“onemodelonthetable”,butinsisted
thatcreativenegotiatorswouldhaveto“in
ventsomethingnew”.Russiandiplomats
havesaidtheymightentertaintheidea.
Thetroubleis,Ukrainehaswritteninto
itsconstitutiontheambitiontojoinnato.
Moreover,FinlandandSwedenareasclose
tonato—andasinteroperablewithit—as
itispossibletobewithoutactuallybeing
members.Indeed,Russia’sbrutishbehav
iouriskindlinga debatewithinbothcoun
triesaboutjoining.Whatismore,Finland,
SwedenandAustriaareallmembersofthe
eu,whichMrPutindislikes,too.
The Normandy process gives France
andGermanya chancetoclaima placeat
thetalkswithRussia,whichhavehitherto
beendominatedbyAmericaandnato, if
onlybecauseRussiasubmittednewtrea
tiestothosetwoentities.TheFrench,al
thoughtheyaremembersofnato, have
unsurprisingly bristled at being merely
“debriefed”bytheAmericans.
Two years ago Mr Macron had an
nouncedthe“braindeath”ofnatoduetoa
double malady: under Donald Trump
Americawasnolongerwillingtoguaran
teeEurope’ssecurity;andsomemembers,
BRITAIN
IRELAND NETH.
DENMARK
NORWAY SWEDEN
FINLAND
HUNGARY
CZECHREP.
AUSTRIA
ROMANIA
MOLDOVA
GEORGIA
BULGARIA
BELARUS
Crimea
BlackSea
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
BELG.
LUX.
GERMANY
POLAND
UKRAINE
RUSSIA
EST.
TURKEY
CYPRUS
FRANCE
GREECE
ALBANIA
MONT.
N.MAC.
LAT.
LITH.
SYRIA
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
ITALY
SLOV.
SLOVAKIA
CROATIA
Controlledby
Russian-backed
separatists
Do
nb
Kyiv as
Moscow
Minsk
Berlin
Paris
Brussels
NordStream 2
pipeline
300 km
Estimated Russian
troop numbers
By base, Feb 8th 2022
,000 7,500
Source: Rochan Consulting
European Union and NATO* membership, 222
EUonly
*MembersalsoincludeIceland,CanadaandUnitedStates
EU and NATO members NATO only