The architecture of humanism; a study in the history of taste

THE ETHICAL

FALLACY

127

isa

form

oftheromantic.

Themoralappeal

becomes

imaginativeand

thereligiousappeal

poetic. Never-

theless, the

arguments which could dismiss

the

RomanticFallacywill

notsufficetomeettheethical

case. Thedifference

betweenthetwoseemsfunda-

mental. Itis,aswesaw,

unreasonabletocondemn

anarchitectural

purposebecause itfailstosatisfy

a

poeticpredilection,forthe

standards

of

poetryand

ofarchitecture

are separate in their provincesand

equalin theirauthority.

But, primafacie,itisnot

inthesamesense

unreasonabletocondemnanarchi-

tectural

purposebecauseitoffendsamoraljudgment

;

forthemoraljudgmentclaimsan

authoritysuperior

totheaesthetic,andappliestoallpurposeandaction

whatsoever. Hence, architecture falls within its

province.

If,then,it

can

be

shown

thatmoralvalues

existat all in architectural style, these, it may be

pleaded, must form our ultimate criterion

;

these

willdeterminewhatweoughttolike,andacriticism

whichignoredtheirexistencewouldbefrivolousand

partial.

It

would not, that is to say, be

a

final

criticism

;

for to the moral judgment belongs the

verdict upon every preference. Why, then, should

the

criticism of

architecture stop short ofthe last

word? And if,fromthisplaincourse,the seeming

oppositionbetween

aestheticandmoralvaluesshould

deter us, mightnotaesthetic good prove, on

a

due

analysis, reducible to

terms of moral good? This