The architecture of humanism; a study in the history of taste

THE

ETHICAL FALLACY i6i

but. But

what are the results, for the critics of

'

Fact,' of theiraversion

—

^historically sojustified

—

to the

methods of

'

Sentiment'? The results are

clear. The

appreciationofbeauty,cut offfromthe

restoflife, neitherilluminatesexperience,nordraws

from

experience any profundities of its own. It

losesthepowerto

interestothers,toinfluencecreation

or

control taste: it becomes small and desiccated

in itself. And

another result is equally apparent.

Appreciation, thus isolated,

discriminates the nice

distinctions of species, but loses sight of the

great

distinction

of genus: the distinction between the

profound and the accomplished.

An accurate and

even

interest studiesFrancois Boucherwith

Bellini

;

anequablecuriosity

extendsitselfindifferentlytothe

plansofBramanteandthe

furniture

of

Chippendale.

For,inthelast

resort,greatartwillbe

distinguished

fromthat which is

merely gestheticallycleverby a

nobility that,

in

its

final analysis,

is moral

;

or,

rather, the nobility

which in life we call

'

moral

'

isitselfaesthetic. Butsince ii

interestsusinlifeas

wellasinart,we

cannot—orshould not

—^meetitin

artwithout asense of

itsimaginative reaches

into

life. And to

separate architecture,

the imaginative

reach of which has

this vital scope

—^architecture

that is profound

—^from architecture

which, though

equallyaccomplished, is

nevertheless

vitallytrivial,

isanecessary

functionevenofsesthetic

criticism.

L