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stock of accumulated obligations that can yield
economic returns to the individual holder,
either on an everyday basis or as investment in
social relations with expected returns in the
marketplace – hence, rendering the cultural into
a form that is fungible with the economic.
While Bourdieu also emphasizes the fungi-
bility of different forms ofcapital(academic,
cultural, social, symbolic) and the reduction of
all forms ultimately to economic capital,
defined as accumulated human labour, his
writing also reveals that ‘social capital’ –
relations ofabstracttrust and reciprocity (dis-
playing qualities of a quasi-public good) that
inhere in society and facilitate economic trans-
actions – as a social resource is: (a) a positive
externalitygenerated by a large number of
individuals able to pursue conduct that they
believe, given their semiotic universe, will earn
them social distinction; (b) an unintended
normative outcome that congeals through a
long history of repeated interaction, rather
than something that can be purposively manu-
factured in a relatively short time span (as
some policy-oriented social theorists and their
institutional backers are prone to claim); and
(c) always anchored to aplaceand acommu-
nity, and as such, containing the potentially
coercive elements of socialsurveillanceand
pressure to conform, backed by the threats of
social exclusion and excommunication
(Gidwani, 2002). vg
Suggested reading
Bebbington, Guggenheim, Olson and Woolcock
(2004); Portes (1998).
social construction The idea that the social
context of individuals and groups constructs
the reality that they know, rather than an inde-
pendent material world. Knowledge is always
relative to the social setting of the inquirers
(cf.relativism), the outcome of an ongoing,
dynamic process of fabrication (anti-realism).
Further, social construction applies as much
to forms of specialized understanding (e.g.
high-energy physics) as it does to everyday,
taken-for-granted knowledge.
Antecedents of social constructionism are
found in Plato, but it was Karl Marx (1818–
83) who established an intellectual agenda
with his claim that the interests of the domin-
ant socialclass(the bourgeoisie) shaped indi-
vidual beliefs (seeideology). Marx (1904,
preface) wrote: ‘It is not the consciousness of
men [sic] that determines their social being,
but, on the contrary, their social being that
determines their consciousness.’ Antonio
Gramsci’s (1891–1937) theory ofhegemony
developed Marx’s idea by arguing that even
seemingly humdrum commonsense thinking
was socially produced and, because they could
not think otherwise, resulted in the working
class consenting to their own domination.
But the most direct statement of social con-
struction was provided in 1966 by two
American sociologists, Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckman. This was significant in
two ways. First, it provided a simple and
remarkably popular sketch of what they called
‘the social construction of reality’(there were
more complicated versions: Luckmann was
keenly interested in Alfred Schu ̈tz’s constitu-
tivephenomenologyand the production of
thelifeworld). Second, it located social con-
struction within the sociology of knowledge.
‘Insofar as all human ‘‘knowledge’’ is devel-
oped, transmitted and maintained in social
situations,’ Berger and Luckmann (1966,
p. 3) wrote, ‘the sociology of knowledge is
concerned with the analysis of the social con-
struction of reality’.
Using the example of religion, Berger and
Luckmann argued that social interaction,
bolstered by associated institutions such as
the church, constructs knowledge, taking on
causal powers and entering everyday life rou-
tines. This insight was later applied byscience
studiesto the physical world, nature, rocks
and quarks (Pickering, 1984). On the surface,
nature appears fixed and constant, to be ‘out
there’, and not dependent upon social beliefs.
But science studies contend that scientific
knowledge is no different from any other kind
of knowledge. Social context operates by shap-
ing the scientific techniques, equipment and
forms of reasoning used by scientists to erect
particular constructions ofnature(and link-
ing with situated knowledge that also
emphasizes the world-making constructions
of scientists and their technology). That scien-
tific knowledge is socially constructed does not
make it wrong, however. What iswrong is
belief in a science that escapes the influence
of its social setting. Rocks and quarks do not
express themselves in their own terms, but
only in the terms of the scientists who speak
for them, and thus thesocial worlds that those
scientists inhabit.
Social construction has had a diffuse but, in
some respects, a widespread influence in
human geography. The first engagements
with Berger and Luckmann’s theses remained
close to their origins in sociology and were
confined to their implications for social
geography, particularly by those sailing under
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SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION