16 The Economist February 19th 2022
BriefingThe Ukraine crisis
“T
he boss never works to someone
else’s timetable,” Margarita Simo
nyan, editorinchief of the propagandist
television network rt, posted to a channel
on Telegram, an encrypted messaging ser
vice on February 15th. She was responding
to Western media reports that America ex
pected Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president,
to launch an invasion of Ukraine at 04:
Moscow time the following morning. Ms
Simonyan delighted in predicting that they
would be wrong footed.
“We showed everyone what we wanted
to show,” she continued, suggesting that
the conclusions spooks, thinktankers, ac
ademics and journalists are drawing from
the unprecedented availability of highres
olution satellite images of Russia’s build
up were open to careful stage management
(see subsequent story). At the end of all the
bragging, though, came the threat: Russian
tanks could go back to the border as fast as
they might be leaving it.
In “The 48 Laws of Power”, a bestselling
selfhelp book by Robert Greene reported
to have a following among convicts, Law
encourages the reader to “Keep others in
suspended terror: Cultivate an air of un
predictability”. It is a thuggish lesson in
which Mr Putin has needed no tuition
since his formative years in the kgb.
On February 15th, the day after Sergei
Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, publicly
told Mr Putin there was still scope for ne
gotiations, in particular armscontrol ne
gotiations, with the West, Russia’s defence
ministry announced it would pull back
some troops from the Ukrainian border.
Later that day the State Duma, Russia's
Kremlincontrolled parliament, called on
the president to recognise the “people’s re
publics” of Donetsk and Luhansk, Russian
backed selfdeclared statelets in the Don
bas region of Ukraine.
Some thought this was Mr Putin’s way
of declaring victory and backing down.
Though the Duma’s motion had been in
troduced by the rump Communist Party, it
had been overwhelmingly endorsed by
representatives of Mr Putin’s United Rus
sia, parliamentarians not noted for inde
pendence of spirit. By recognising the sta
telets—and thus their claims to the parts of
the Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk and Lu
hansk that they do not control (see map)—
Russia would establish a formal territorial
disagreement on which to pin its dispute
with Ukraine. It would also in effect have
annexed more of its territory; in practice it
already controls the statelets, but now they
would be allies where Russia could garri
son its forces quite blatantlyas a “defence”
against purported, perhaps invented, ag
gressions. On February 17th Russian media
reported fighting on the contact line in
Donbas. Mr Putin’s flack said Ukraine’s
“provocative actions” had intensified.
But at an afternoon press conference
with the visiting German chancellor, Olaf
Scholz, Mr Putin indicated that although
he would take the parliamentary vote into
account he was not minded to follow
through on it—at least not yet. Though he
continues to hold, ridiculously, that Uk
raine is prosecuting “genocide” in Donbas,
for now, he says, the best way of resolving
that problem is for Ukraine to abide by the
“Minsk accords” of 201415, which would
require it to grant the rebellious statelets
an asyetundefined autonomy within Uk
MOSCOW
Whatever Vladimir Putin does next, his willingness to threaten war has changed
the nature of his regime irreversibly and to Russia’s disadvantage
A grim look out
→Alsointhissection
19 Watching the border