18 Briefing The Ukraine crisis The Economist February 19th 2022
seeking; they digitised and modernised
the financial system, they revamped and
modernised cities. Despite the sanctions
imposed on Russia in 2014 after its annex
ation of Crimea and aggression against Uk
raine they have reduced debt to just 20% of
gdp, brought down inflation, built up
$620bn of reserves and constructed a “for
tress economy”. Others are businesspeople
who managed to survive and prosper de
spite a worsening economic climate and
the predations of Mr Putin’s cronies. Many
of these men and women are looking for
escape routes.
Over the years most in the elite have
made political and moral compromises.
Some did not like the suppression of politi
cal freedom, but they did not object to it ei
ther. Participating in rent redistribution
while privately grumbling about the re
gime seemed more sensible and profitable.
And then there are highlevel officials and
Mr Putin’s cronieswho have accumulated
vast wealth in Russia and parked it in Swiss
bank accounts and the London property
market. If Mr Putin takes Russia to war,
such people stand to lose much, even all, of
what they have accumulated.
Their borderline panic is not an un
lookedfor sideeffect of Mr Putin’s bellig
erence; it is part of the point of it. Mr Pu
tin’s willingness to shed blood is a threat
not just to Ukraine. It is also a threat he
wants taken on board at home. Where once
his system worked by coopting the elites,
it is now based on their fear.
Whether it comes about or not, the
threat of war strengthens the power Rus
sia’s securocrats, the siloviki, hold over its
other elites. Any increased difficulty in
moving, or moving assets, abroad makes
their power harder to shrug off. Height
ened tensions allow them to clamp down
with even less justification than usual onany attitudes that can be deemed unpatri
otic—such as criticisms of military spend
ing or a plummeting exchange rate. With
the country on a war footing it becomes
easier to trip into treason. Part of the elite’s
sense of increasing threat is that the worse
things get for the country, the firmer the
grip of the siloviki will become.
Their position is articulated by Nikolai
Patrushev, who as head of the country’s se
curity council has assumed the role of the
chief ideologue among the former kgb
men who dominate the Russian state. Rus
sia is locked in a civilisational and geopo
litical fight for its life, he argues. The West
is trying to destroy it by “aggressively ad
vancing neoliberal values that contradict
our worldview”. The unsustainable truth
The siloviki have been in the ascendant for
some time. Their power went up a notch
after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Their sense of success bolstered, as one se
nior government official admits, by the
elite’s efforts to keep Russia’s show on the
road, their control increased further in the
authoritarian turn the country took after
the attempted assassination of Alexei Na
valny, de facto leader of the opposition, in2020. As any mayor or governor can testify,
government meetings are attended by a
prosecutor and a representative of the se
curity services. This is increasingly thwart
ing efforts to get things done.
In 2007, at the start of his national polit
ical career, Mr Navalny framed his aspira
tions in terms of “a final battle between
good and neutrality”. Ever since he has ar
gued that it is the unwillingness of a con
formist, compromised elite to join in that
battle which has ensured the regime’s sta
bility. The fact that repression is increas
ingly aimed at that elite itself is strength
ening his point. So is the international re
sponse to the threats towards Ukraine. By
treating a Russian invasion as a likely out
come and threatening serious reprisals the
West has sent a powerful signal to the Rus
sian elite.
In the past, many could plead ignorance
or innocence. It was not they who shot
down a civilian airliner over Ukraine in
2014, who beat up protesters, who poi
soned Mr Navalny, who shut down human
rights organisations. Faced with the pros
pect of Russia’s aggression leading to
deaths by the thousand and national igno
miny, though, they can no longer avoid re
sponsibility. For some the risks of being
held accountable for Mr Putin’s actions in
case of a war now outweigh the benefits of
serving the system. The elite’s “neutrality”
has become harder to sustain—even as the
rising power of the siloviki puts more pres
sure on them to do so.
Mr Putin’s gamble on creating a plausi
ble threat of war without sliding into battle
might bring him some shortlived gains. If
he were to withdraw his troops in earnest,
he might yet come out seemingly ahead. As
Mr Navalny has observed, reaping rewards
for not carrying through on threats is a pro
tectionracketeer’s tactic in which Mr Pu
tin has form. Meanwhile a focus on the in
ternational allows internal matters to go
relatively unnoticed. Few outside Russia
have paid attention to Mr Navalny being
put on trial again.
But there has been a marked escalation
in what he has had to threaten in order to
get paid off with external acquiescence and
internal suppression—if that is indeed
what happens. In 2014 the annexation of
Crimea proved capable of changing a do
mestic context increasingly shaped by
protests on the street. This time the threat
of a major war has been required. And a
freakedout elite kept in line only through
fear will make matters a great deal worse at
home.Russia is facing shortages of both
unqualified and qualified labour; more
and more young and entrepreneurial peo
ple see emigration as their only option.
The antiMoscow sentiment already rife in
many regions is only likely to get stronger.
And a country that still considers itself part
of Europe has little love for a tactic which
can but make it more dependent on China.
Mr Putin cannot revive growth, for that
would require structural reforms that
would destabilise politics. He cannot re
verse the brain drain, because that would
require taming his security services. He
cannot deal with the demands of the young
or the regions, because that would require
him to quit. An isolated, bored and ageing
leader, increasingly reliant on a small cote
rie of similar age and kgbbackground, he
prefers geopolitical posturing and war
games, where results are visible and in
stantly gratifying. He is reconciled to rulThe way it looks in Ukraine