The Dynamics of Religious Economies 101
religious firm can satisfy all market niches (see Stark and Finke 2000). More specifically,
pluralism arises in unregulated markets because of the inability of a single religious
firm to be at once worldly and otherworldly, strict and permissive, exclusive and in-
clusive, expressive and reserved, or (as Adam Smith put it) austere and loose, while
market niches will exist with strong preferences on each of these aspects of religion.
Thus, no single religious organization can achieve monopoly through voluntary as-
sent – religious monopolies rest on coercion.
By the same logic, it becomes clear that religious economies never can be fully
monopolized, even when backed by the full coercive powers of the state. Indeed, even
at the height of its temporal power, the medieval church was surrounded by heresy and
dissent (Lambert 1992). Of course, when the repressive efforts of the state are sufficiently
intense, religious firms competing with the state-sponsored monopoly will be forced
to operate underground. But whenever and wherever repression eases, pluralism will
begin to develop. And this pluralism will be sustained by specialized religious firms,
each anchored in a specific niche or a complementary set of niches.
Regulation and Sacralization
Although we strongly disagree with Berger’s earlier contentions that religious pluralism
will erode the plausibility of all religions, we do agree that monopolies are far more
effective in exerting power over other institutions.
#2: To the degree that a religious firm achieves a monopoly, it will seek to exert its
influence over other institutions and thus the society will be sacralized.The term
sacralized meansthat there will be little differentiation between religious and secular insti-
tutions and that the primary aspects of life, from family to politics, will be suffused with
religious symbols, rhetoric, and ritual.This is precisely the social phenomenon that so
often is mistaken for universal piety. The Age of Faith attributed to medieval Europe,
for example, is based on the fact that religion was intertwined with other institutions,
especially politics and education, and because the presence of religion was so impres-
sively visible. Traveling across Europe today, one’s attention constantly is drawn to the
magnificent churches and cathedrals that dominate local landscapes. Because all these
buildings were built many centuries ago, they seem to offer undeniable proof that once-
upon-a-time faith was so universal and robust as to erect these marvelous structures.
The truth is quite different. These structures were, in effect, extracted from an unwilling
and sullen populace who seldom crossed their thresholds – at least, not for religious
purposes. It was because of the piety (and interests) of the medieval ruling classes that
religion was so omnipresent and visible on all public occasions. For example, all cere-
monies were religious in character, especially political ceremonies such as coronations.
Indeed, in sacralized societies political leadership per se typically has a vivid religious
hue, as in the “divine right” of kings and emperors. Close ties between religious and
political elites are inherent in religious monopolies since without such ties religious
monopolies are impossible. Sacralization of the political sphere is thequid pro quoby
which a religious firm enlists the coercive powers of the state against its competitors.
The inverse of the sacralization, which occurs with religious monopolies, is the
desacralization that occurs when monopolies lose the capacity to regulate the religious
economy.