The Economist - USA (2022-02-26)

(Maropa) #1

46 Middle East & Africa The EconomistFebruary 26th 2022


Tirades  from  a  faction  of  the  African
National Congress (anc) have been echoed
by  the  Economic  Freedom  Fighters  (eff),
anopposition party led by Julius Malema, a
race­baiting  former  head  of  the  anc‘s
youth  wing.  His  calls  to  grab  land  from
white farmers influence the left of the rul­
ing party. Mr Malema has described judges
as  “traumatised  old  people”.  An  eff mp
called the country’s chief prosecutor, Sha­
mila Batohi, a “renowned Indian racist”.
Why the increase in vitriol? One reason
is what Hugh Corder, also of uct, calls “the
burgeoning  scourge  of  ‘Lawfare’”.  As  the
presidency  and  parliament  have  proven
inept,  and  as  politics  has  become  more
fractious,  courts  have  been  asked  to  step
in.  Dikgang  Moseneke,  who  retired  from
the  Constitutional  Court  in  2016,  notes
that,  towards  the  end  of  his  tenure,  “our
democratic  system  appeared  to  have  lost
the  capacity  to  mediate  conflict  at  sites
other  than  the  courts  of  law”.  When  one
side loses they attack the referee. Mr Mose­
neke  adds  that  political  elites  have  every
reason  to  fight  their  battles  in  court  be­
cause taxpayers cover their legal costs.
Yet  complaints  about  overbearing
courts are often cloaks for self­interest. Mr
Zuma is already on trial for fraud and brib­
ery,  on  charges  dating  back  to  the  2000s.
He and his allies may face prosecution for
graft during his presidency. Senior figures
in and close to the effare alleged by South
African  journalists  to  have  been  involved
in  defrauding  a  bank  (the  party  denies
wrongdoing).  Such  people  are  naturally
keen to weaken a legal system that may de­
cide their fate.
It would help if those meant to defend
the courts did a better job. The recently re­
tired chief justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng, was
absent for much of the past year, in part be­
cause he was spreading the gospel as a lay
preacher. He did a poor job of chairing the
Judicial Services Commission (jsc), a body
of lawyers and political appointees that ad­
vises  on  judicial  appointment.  In  recent
years  the  highest  court  has  rarely  been  at
its full complement of 11 judges. It current­
ly  has  three  vacancies.  None  of  the  white
candidates were shortlisted, seemingly be­
cause of their race. Interviews of potential
successors  to  Mr  Mogoeng  became  dis­
graceful political theatre led by Mr Malema
and  Dali  Mpofu,  a  former  chair  of  the  eff
and lawyer for Mr Zuma. One judge was ac­
cused  without  evidence  of  being  a  sexual
predator; another of being too political.
Mr  Ramaphosa,  who  helped  draft  the
constitution in the 1990s, should be doing
more  to  defend  the  judiciary.  He  ought  to
have  fired  Ms  Sisulu,  who  took  an  oath  to
defend  the  constitution  she  now  attacks.
He  has  dawdled  over  picking  a  new  chief
justice,  whom  he  can  appoint  without  a
recommendation  from  the  jsc(by  law  he
just needs to consult the body).

Nicole Fritz of the Helen Suzman Foun­
dation, an ngo, worries that difficulties
faced by whites and those of Indian origin
in getting senior judicial jobs, and the per­
sonal attacks on judges of all races, mean
that good candidates will stop applying.
She fears the “long but irreversible decline
of the judiciary”. Mr de Vos frets that South
Africa may become like India, where a ju­
diciary once lauded for progressive judg­
ments has been undermined by politicians
with authoritarian tendencies.
For a while the courts were one of the
few institutions that retained the confi­
dence of the rainbow nation. No longer. In
2006 no less than 69% of South Africans
said they trusted courts “a lot” or “some­
what”, according to Afrobarometer, a poll­
ster. Today just 42% say they do. It is a find­
ing that should worry liberals—and cheer
Mr Zuma and Mr Malema. n

Jihadists in west Africa

Lines in the sand


A


drone whirsoverhead as Ivorian spe­
cial forces creep out of the under­
growth towards a mock village. French
trainers watch closely. Nearby, Ghanaian
commandos roar down a dusty road before
an explosion sends them retreating under
the gaze of British soldiers. Operation
Flintlock, an annual counter­terrorism
training exercise, appears to be going just
as it should: regional forces learning from
grizzled Western commandos.
Yet Flintlock also encapsulates some of
the weaknesses undermining the West’s
efforts to train local armies to defeat the ji­
hadists who have overrun large parts of
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and are now

attacking places to the south (see map).
These include a lack of leadership by coun­
tries in the region, a troubling retreat from
democracy and failed efforts to win the
support of disgruntled populations.
Flintlock is meant to be African­led. It
is anything but. It has been largely Western
troops, rather than forces from the region,
that have shaped strategies to fight the ji­
hadists in the Sahel. Meanwhile troops
from the two worst­hit countries—Burkina
Faso and Mali—did not attend Flintlock.
This is because in both countries colonels
(who had attended previous Flintlock exer­
cises) have booted out the elected govern­
ments in coups.
What is more, Flintlock is a good exam­
ple of a broad failure to communicate with
local populations, something the com­
mandos running the exercise repeatedly
say is the key to defeating insurgencies.
Foreign correspondents were free to hang
around during the exercises, but local jour­
nalists were only allowed to attend the
opening ceremony.
Such weaknesses have grave conse­
quences. Take Mali, which is losing its bat­
tle against the jihadists. After its elected
government failed to stem the violence, ar­
my officers cheered on by protesters boot­
ed it out. Unable to do a better job, the junta
has instead deflected blame for its failure
onto France and welcomed Russian merce­
naries. On February 17th France and its
European allies said they would pull their
troops out of Mali, which seems to have
been largely lost to the insurgency. Rear
Admiral Jamie Sands, the head of American
special forces in Africa, concedes that jiha­
dists are already able to move around most
of the country unimpeded.
With Mali all but written off, the front
lines are shifting. In Burkina Faso, where
last year more people were killed than in
Mali, many hope the junta will be more ef­
fective at fighting jihadists than the elect­
ed government it displaced. To the east
Mohamed Bazoum, Niger’s president, wor­
ries that without French troops in Mali, his

J ACQUEVILLE AND ABIDJAN
Coastal states are bracing themselves
for a jihadist storm

S A H E L
NIGER

MALI

BURKINA
FASO

NIGERIA
IVORY
COAST

GUINEA

MAURITANIA

GHANA

BENIN
TOGO

2018

Bamako

S A H E L
NIGER

MALI

BURKINA
FASO

NIGERIA
IVORY
COAST

GUINEA

MAURITANIA

GHANA

BENIN
TOGO

Abidjan

Gulf of Guinea

2021-22†

Jacqueville

SAHEL

Deaths* 5 25

Deadly events involving jihadist groups
50
Sources: ACLED;
José Luengo-Cabrera

*Incl. all reported civilian and
combatant deaths †To Feb th 500 km
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