42 TheEconomistAugust 3rd 2019
1T
he tipwas sent by a city tech worker: a
single person could, in one fell swoop,
disable almost every traffic light in Vilnius,
Lithuania’s capital. It proved true, says Au-
rimas Navys, a former officer at Lithuania’s
State Security Department. Mr Navys, who
had received the tip despite his recent re-
tirement, made sure the vulnerability was
fixed. Lithuania and the other Baltic states,
Estonia and Latvia, all natomembers, are
scrambling, he says, to identify such weak-
nesses and the individuals who might ex-
ploit them on behalf of Russia. Mr Navys
reckons that the defensive efforts of the
Baltic states have multiplied tenfold since- That was when Russia seized Crimea
and, in Ukraine’s east, set off separatist
fighting that continues today.
Russia pulled that off with help from
supporters in Ukraine, many of whom had
been discreetly cultivated by Russia’s intel-
ligence agencies and Spetsnaz special
forces. Kremlin supporters in Ukraine’s
military bureaucracy in Kiev proved espe-
cially damaging, Mr Navys says. They de-
liberately stalled Ukraine’s response to the
seizure of its territory. (Among the Ukrai-
nians arrested for aiding Russia in 2014 was
Ukraine’s army chief at the time, Volody-
myr Zamana, though he was later freed.)
Ukraine had failed to search hard enough
for Russian assets in its midst, says Rai-
mundas Karoblis, Lithuania’s defence min-
ister. “We now, after Ukraine, have learned
the lessons,” he says.
The Baltics are keen to avoid Ukraine’s
mistakes. Recent remarks by Russian offi-
cials and Kremlin mouthpieces have high-
lighted the danger. As their propaganda has
it, parts of Lithuania were gifts from Mos-
cow in Soviet times and therefore rightful-
ly belong to Russia. Troublingly, that was
Russia’s rationale for annexing Crimea.The Baltic states reckon that to thwart a
destabilisation campaign that Russia
could launch, perhaps to support an armed
attack, they should determine who might
be susceptible to the Kremlin’s bidding. So
the search is on for people involved in what
officials call “Russian influence activities”
as well as, more darkly, “sleeper cells” that
could be activated from Moscow.
Consider the following hypothetical ex-
ample, says Stephen Flanagan, a specialist
on eastern Europe at America’s National
Security Council during Russia’s offensive
in Ukraine. A rumour spreads that an eth-
nic Russian girl in Estonia has been raped.
A local pro-Kremlin motorcycle gang is
told to wreak havoc. The Kremlin, which
has asserted a right to protect ethnic Rus-
sians abroad, might then send in troops. At
least two Russian security agencies operate
in the Baltic states, says Mr Flanagan, who,
before leaving government, studied the re-
gion’s defences against Russia.
Most of the suspects identified by Lith-
uania’s security agencies as part of this ef-
fort are classified as Kremlin “supporters”.
People in this category might do things like
pass along the fabrications against Baltic
democracies that crop up relentlessly on-
line. In April, for example, a bogus report
asserted that Mr Karoblis had been arrested
for accepting a bribe to promote American
interests at Lithuania’s defence ministry.
In one iteration, he was shown behind bars
in a faked photograph. Lithuania has
placed a smaller number of suspects in a
different category: “potential doers”. Offi-Russian subversionThe enemy within
VILNIUS AND WASHINGTON, DC
The Baltic states are increasing efforts to identify people who might subvert
democracy at the Kremlin’s behestEurope
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