transition to socialism). The global struggle would be both relentless
and prolonged, as imperialism (led by the United States) was bent on
destroying the socialist commonwealth. And the primary arena would
be the Third World.
This was the Chinese Marxist–Leninist view of the balance of
global forces, one that was largely shared by leaders of revolutionary
movements in Southeast Asia. The translation of this view of the
world into foreign policy was another matter, however. Realistic analy-
sis of the balance of military and economic power, and the pragmatic
assessment of national interest were never absent from Chinese foreign
policy, even if this was at times ideologically driven. As in other states,
domestic politics also had a significant impact on international rela-
tions, especially at times of internal conflict. So, too, had the way in
which foreign policy decisions were arrived at. In the case of the PRC,
the highly centralised and hierarchical power structure limited input
into foreign policy decision making. In fact, Mao Zedong and Zhou
Enlai were personally responsible for all major foreign policy initiatives
during their lifetimes.
It has frequently been pointed out how structurally similar
communist government, as an authoritarian dictatorship exercised by
the CCP, was at its upper levels to government as exercised by the
equally authoritarian Confucian mandarinate. A similar power struc-
ture, it should be noted, also characterised the Nationalist government
under the GMD. The ideological justification might have changed,
but not belief about how power should be concentrated and exercised,
and by whom. ‘Democratic centralism’ preserved the hierarchy of
political power and the patriarchal exclusion (of all but a token few
women) that had been characteristic of Confucianism. The CCP, like
the mandarinate, retained a monopoly on both orthodoxy and the
path to political power. A new orthodoxy had to be learned and
recited, but it functioned in a structurally similar way to Confucianism
to exclude not only all alternative views, but also all those not
inducted into it. Lucian Pye has called the resulting system ‘Confucian
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia